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Dissertation Abstract  
The Ambivalence of Participation in Transitional Justice: The Promises and Failures of 
Peace in Colombia 
The dissertation inquires into participation in transitional justice in Colombia. Through an 
examination of Peace Councils and Mesas de Participación, it offers readers concrete 
examples of such mechanisms for participation, discussing their legal and bureaucratic 
structures. Weaving in ethnographic research, the author allows the participants 
themselves, victimized-survivors of the armed conflict and community leaders, to discuss 
the limits and possibilities of their work. Placing these voices and archival research in 
historic and theoretical context, the dissertation leaves readers with questions regarding 
the ambivalence of state, institutional, and participant’s stances towards participation in 
transitional justice.  
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Chapter One: The Research Problem 
Statement of the Problem 
 This study inquires into victims’ participation in transitional justice in Colombia 
at a crucial time for the construction of peace.   While the interviews were conducted in 1
the first few months of 2018, the work as a whole draws on over a decades-long 
immersion into human rights research in Colombia. It explores the space between the 
legal frameworks for mechanisms of participation and the experiences of representatives 
of victims’ associations and community research groups organizing and participating in 
them. Doing so, it poses important questions for the conception and formulation of 
participation for scholars in Transitional justice Studies, advocates of Transitional justice 
programs, and to the field of human rights more broadly. 
 While interviews were conducted in the first few months of 2018, the work as a 
whole draws on over a decades-long immersion into human rights research in Colombia. 
This work, while examining the current conditions under which participation in 
transitional justice occurs and how it contours the experiences of participants, 
understands these conditions as not simply a product of the political present. Colombia 
has been under various states of conflict since its foundation. The current armed conflict, 
ongoing for over a half a century, has produced a robust legacy of civil society 
 In using the term “victim” here, I am addressing its official usage by state institutions, upon which I 1
elaborate later. In other instances not referring directly to the state category and its adoption by civil 
society, and following the example of post-colonial feminist scholarship, I use victimized-survivor to 
address those living who have been victimized by the armed conflict (Chatterji et al, 2016, p. 265). This 
usage is in line with critiques of victimization and victimhood, that refuse a marginalization of the agency 
of victimized-survivors. (Chatterji et al, 2016; Mohanty, 1984). On the contrary, Colombian victimized-
survivors have and continue to display inordinate amounts of courage and capacity in leading efforts 
towards truth, justice, and reparation.
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mobilization against violence, forcing the development of dense and progressive 
jurisprudence related to human rights, participation, and peace. This both includes and 
stems from histories of negotiated agreements between the state and armed groups. 
Despite these histories of resistance and state response, the armed conflict in Colombia 
continues. This context is important as we examine what has brought us to this moment 
of transitional justice in Colombia, helping us to resist facile explanations for its current 
failings and possibilities.  
 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is a product of 
violence. The guerrilla army emerged from the ashes of La Violencia, a decade long civil 
war that shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of Colombians, while displacing 
another million, and reinforcing the lesson that many across Colombia had learned from a 
long history of civil wars:  political violence, while illegitimate, is a brutally effective 
tool of political force and control.  In the seventy years since La Violencia, political 2
violence has become a mainstay of life in Colombia as insurgency and counter-
insurgency, and its consequent paramilitarization have combined with the United States’ 
War on Drugs to spread violence to every region of Colombia (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2016). Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives, while 
millions have been forced from their homes (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 
2017). Gendered and sexualized violence, both a direct and indirect effect of the war, are 
 Depending on how they are counted, Colombia endured between four and nine civil wars between its 2
founding in 1819 and La Violencia in 1948. In particular, the four civil wars between 1876 and 1899 
contoured a political struggle between the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties that saw the 
exercise of violence as principal to Colombian politics (Palacios, 2006). Not counted in these civil wars 
were a great number of regional armed insurgencies and conflicts that did not become national in scale.
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widespread (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2017). Corruption, fueled by 
military aid and international capital, has become endemic to government at all levels (El 
Tiempo, 2017).  
 Yet civil society in Colombia has remained vibrant. Victimized-survivors of the 
armed conflict have organized, working with national and international organizations to 
document abuses, advocate for justice and restitution, and call for an end to the war. 
Despite a history of failed or partial peace agreements between the various guerrilla 
groups, and a paramilitary demobilization effort under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe 
(2002-2010) that saw few crimes prosecuted, even fewer punished, and led to a 
reconstitution of paramilitary forces across Colombia, civil society groups and human 
rights organizations have been insistent on a negotiated end to the internal armed conflict 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2012; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 
2014). 
 In April of 2011, the FARC initiated peace talks with the then-recently elected 
President Juan Manuel Santos, having been denied such talks by Uribe’s previous 
government. Following years of negotiation in Havana, Cuba, with international support 
and civil society participation, the Final Agreement To End the Armed Conflict and Build 
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A Stable and Lasting Peace was signed on November 24th, 2016.  The Peace Accord is 3
organized under six chapters with related provisions:  
1. Comprehensive Rural Reform,  
2. Political Participation,  
3. Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities 
and Laying down of Arms,  
4. Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem,  
5. Victims, and Implementation and  
6. Verification Mechanisms.  
 In effect, the Peace Accord presents a framework for a comprehensive system of 
transitional justice: mechanisms for truth, accountability, restitution, and non-repetition 
seeking a just transition away from armed conflict and towards stable democratic 
governance. Further, it explicitly seeks to guarantee the rights of victims, ethnic 
communities, and other vulnerable groups such as women, children, and Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgendered (LGBT) persons. It provides for a system of limited amnesty for 
political crimes that requires acts of restitution to affected individuals and communities 
while mandating sentences for grave violations of human rights. It also creates temporary 
and non-voting congressional seats for a non-violent FARC political party and opens the 
 Official talks began in Havana, Cuba, gathering steam as both parties signed a “General Agreement for 3
the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace” that gave structure to 
the negotiations. In the proceeding years, the FARC issued several temporary unilateral cease-fires before 
an agreement to an indefinite bilateral ceasefire with a commitment to total disarmament by the FARC 
was signed in June of 2016. The final agreement was announced in August of that year, and while a 
popular referendum to accept the deal was rejected by a narrow margin in October, The FARC and the 
Colombian Government modified the agreement and signed the Final Peace Accord at a formal ceremony 
on November 24th 2016, followed by congressional ratification on December 1st (Segura & Mechoulan, 
2017). 
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door for legitimate participation in government. Lastly, it commits to a sweeping program 
of agrarian reform as well as a system of verification for the implementation of the 
accord, with international oversight. 
 The international community responded with commendation. The Nobel Prize       
for Peace was awarded to then president, Juan Manuel Santos in 2016, and foreign states 
committed hundreds of millions of dollars towards the implementation of the accord. Yet, 
some four years on, the peace process continues to be limited in its implementation of 
transitional justice.  The Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre 4
Dame, which has been charged with monitoring and verifying the implementation of the 
Accord, has produced yearly reports that show the limited success. While demobilization 
of the FARC was accomplished at a large scale with relatively uncommon speed and 
comprehensiveness, processes of truth, justice and reparation, those that deal with 
addressing both the conditions for and effects of the armed conflict, remain partial or 
uninitiated. Most troubling has been an increase in violence in areas formally occupied by 
the FARC as criminal organizations, often reconstituted paramilitary forces, fill the power 
vacuum. Human rights defenders and social leaders have been targeted by such groups 
leading to a dramatic increase in selective assassinations (Guevara & Sánchez, 2017). 
This incomplete and violent context for the implementation of the Peace Accord has been 
exacerbated by a change in government which occurred in 2018 with the election of 
President Iván Duque of the Democratic Centre Party, just months after the completion of 
 While it is salient to mention here that Iván Duque Márquez from the Centro Democratico party was 4
elected in August of 2018 on a platform resistant to the full implementation of the Peace Accords, it 
should be remembered that Colombia has a long history of failing to fully implement laws and 
agreements towards the fulfillment of human rights. 
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my interviews in Colombia.  Duque ran on a platform explicitly looking for the 5
dismantling of the Peace Accord as it was signed, seeking the removal of key provisions 
for accountability, truth, and rural reform. In the time since his election, his presidency 
has faced a collapse of credibility, often seen as duplicitous in its policy, if not outright 
corrupt. Acknowledging this tension between professed support for peace processes, the 
failure to enact meaningful implementation of the Peace Accord, and inability or 
unwillingness to protect social leaders and participants in transitional justice, is key to 
understanding the ambivalent posture of the Colombian state in regards to human rights 
and addressing the root causes of the conflict. This ambivalence, is not solely the 
responsibility of any singular political figure or party, and extends backwards in time 
across recent decades. 
 This is a crucial moment in the history of the armed conflict in Colombia. Past 
agreements have failed or been limited in effect, leading to the reconstitution of armed 
groups and the escalation of violence (Rúa Delgado, 2015). Transitional justice programs, 
in other places and at other times, have collapsed or been unable to accomplish a long-
lasting reduction of political and social violence. For many victimized-survivors of the 
internal armed conflict, the promise of transitional justice is the result of decades of 
 The complexity of recent Colombian political history points to the close connections of its recent 5
presidents. Juan Manuel Santos was the Minister of Defense under Álvaro Uribe. While his presidency 
was initially supported by his predecessor, Uribe began to openly denounce Santos’s policies, particularly 
in regards to his support of a negotiated peace with the FARC. This conflict led to the establishment of the 
Democratic Centre by Uribe, an ultra conservative political party established in opposition to the 
traditional Conservative party, under which both Santos and Uribe served. Duque, a member of the 
Democratic Centre, is seen as having his presidency both bolstered and overshadowed by the interests of 
Uribe. 
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organizing and advocacy in the face of ongoing threats and violence.  Progress towards 
transitional justice that sees Colombia meeting its international human rights 
responsibilities is key to the government’s economic and political future. However, the 
problem of the implementation of the Peace Accord and the way it affects the lives of 
those most proximate to human rights violations, its victimized-survivors, remains central 
to an understanding of Colombia’s recent history with important implications for 
transitional justice programs across the world.  
 Critiques of transitional justice efforts in Colombia and elsewhere have addressed 
a wide variety of concerns including their often “top-down” nature, the focus on state 
processes, and the exclusion of marginalized segments of the population, including 
victimized-survivors themselves, in the design and implementation of its mechanisms 
(Cuéllar, 2017; McEvoy & McGregor, 2008). Efforts to localize transitional justice by 
ensuring the meaningful participation of all stakeholders including victimized-survivors 
of the armed conflict and of human rights violations have been proposed by scholars and 
advocates as a way to address these issues and ensure an inclusive and sustainable peace 
process that addresses the root causes of the conflict while repairing the damage done to 
society by decades of civil war (Shaw, Warf, & Hazan, 2010).  
 Participation is increasingly becoming a key term in transitional justice 
studies, and studies of its impact and long-term effect are starting to circulate 
(Hilton, 2011). This study, by engaging in participatory research with a local 
advocacy and research organization, and conducting in-depth interviews with 
representatives of victims’ organizations participating in transitional justice 
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mechanisms, as well as with other human rights advocates, seeks to contribute to 
this growing literature. Through this study of local knowledge, I examined a few 
key structures employed by the state in meeting, or failing to meet, its 
constitutional and international responsibilities to provide spaces for meaningful 
and effective participation of victims. Combining archival research that includes 
local and international human rights reporting, critical scholarship, participant 
observation, and interviews, this study provides advocates, policy officials, and 
human rights scholars with a critical and grounded perspective on participation in 
transitional justice. Critical examinations of the current situation in Colombia are 
markedly valuable given the importance of the Peace Accord. Human Rights 
advocates, researchers, and policy officials, in particular, are interested in the 
approach taken by the Peace Accord, many already stating that it will serve as a 
model for future transitional justice programs, particularly in contexts of ongoing 
armed conflict (Saffron & Uprimny, 2007; van Nievelt, 2016).  
 In summary, this work is organized around four objectives: 
1. Legal and Bureaucratic Structures of Participation: this study describes 
the legal foundation for participation in transitional justice and other 
peace processes in Colombia, referring to its Constitution, and a 
complex set of laws that establish mechanisms for participation.  
2. Participatory Research: this study offers meaningful contributions to El 
Centro de Estudios Politicos (CEPO), a local organizing and research 
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collective, while gaining an understanding of their role in supporting the 
creation of local participatory bodies. 
3. Participation and Victimized-Survivors: this study offers an 
understanding of the experiences and perspectives of participants in 
transitional justice mechanisms. 
4. Participation in Transitional justice Studies: this study offers 
considerations for an understanding of the limits and possibilities of 
participation in addressing key questions in Transitional justice Studies.  
My research questions, detailed above and below, dig into these objectives. The 
questions break apart the relationship between transitional justice and 
Participation, organizing an inquiry into the structure of legal frameworks, the 
politics of victims’ participation, and their combined effect on the actuality of the 
implementation of Accord. 
Background and Need for the Study 
 The armed conflict in Colombia has no single agreed upon origin. Various events, 
dates, and figures emerge throughout historical accounts to give record and ground to 
various phenomena. Did the armed conflict that continues today begin with or after La 
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Violencia?  Were the origins of modern paramilitarism Los Pajaros?  Or rather a result of 6 7
Decree 3398 of 1965 which made the permanent defense of the nation-state an obligation 
for all citizens, legalizing the formation of right-wing militias? Or perhaps a result of a 
clandestine alliance between Colombian and U.S. intelligence forces with right-wing 
militias and rival narco-trafficking cartels to assassinate Colombia’s most known cartel 
leader, Pablo Escobar, known as MAS (Death to Kidnappers, in its Spanish acronym)? I 
am certainly not in a position to enter these historiographic disputes, but would rather 
point to enduring conditions of economic inequality; racial, regional, and gendered 
dispossession; and political violence to give a broad context to understand the ongoing 
conflict. 
La Violencia 
 The 1940s witnessed social movements composed of liberals, socialists, and 
communists, both rural agricultural workers and a consolidating industrial labor force, 
responding to increasing inequality and economic depression through mass mobilization, 
land occupation, and regional strikes (Molano, 2015). Throughout the country, local 
police forces and private militias, under the orders of conservative politicians and capital 
interests, retaliated violently in a series of assassinations and massacres (Molano, 2015). 
These acts combined in a campaign of political cleansing that sought to determine the 
outcome of local elections. Those persecuted - namely, liberals, communists, socialists 
 Indeed, President Uribe, during his long tenure as president refused to recognize the existence of an 6
internal armed conflict. Insisting instead that it was simply a matter of domestic terrorism requiring an 
internal police response ungoverned by the Geneva Conventions. 
 “The Birds”, were bands of right-wing mercenaries used to carry out assassinations and massacres on 7
behalf of Conservative forces during La Violencia. 
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and other dissidents of the Conservative Party—organized themselves into armed groups 
for the protection of their communities. These groups eventually evolved into modern 
guerrilla forces, urban and rural militias seeking to use violence for self-protection and 
towards political change (Molano, 2015) . This context of escalating violence, historians 8
tell, was a tinderbox awaiting a spark that came in the form of the assassination of Liberal 
presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán during a political rally in Bogotá on April 9, 
1948. This event, known as El Bogatazo, is often described as the start of La Violencia. 
Blood flowed freely in the following decade as war spread from region to region, 
resulting in over 300,000 deaths (Palacios, 2006). Yet, such an accounting neglects the 
psychosocial dimensions of a war whose dead were, in their overwhelming majority, non-
combatants. Victims of violence were more often targets of revenge or personal gain than 
military strategy, resulting in the deaths of entire families and villages. Rape was 
common, and women were over one-fifth of those killed (Palacios, 2006, p.136).  
 The militias born to this landscape of violence would become the guerrillas of 
today’s conflict. Escaping burned villages, the victimized-survivors of La Violencia’s 
atrocities gathered in relatively inaccessible mountains and jungles, forming 33 armed 
commands across Colombia (Molano, 2015). It wasn’t until 1965, in the aftermath of a 
failed agrarian reform that promised to address displacement, unequal distribution of 
land, and poverty, that a number of these groups gathered to coordinate efforts, forming 
 This history of the evolution of guerrilla groups, which preceded that of paramilitary groups, differs in a 8
myriad of ways. Firstly, paramilitary groups were not self-organized defense groups of displaced 
community members, instead they were recruited forces brought together and paid by large land owners 
and local elites. As such, their goals have been centered around the protection (and expansion) of private 
property and the maintenance of the political status quo. Additionally, paramilitary groups have generally 
approached the use of violence in more generalized ways, seeking to produce generalized terror through 
its undiscriminating and spectacular use. 
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the FARC. Until its recent demobilization, The FARC was the longest running guerrilla 
insurgency in the world, fighting the most protracted civil war in the history of the 
Americas. In the nearly sixty years that have followed, the war has expanded to touch 
every region of Colombia.   9
 Over the decades the armed conflict grew in complexity, as armed actors with 
contradicting ideological and strategic goals joined in the conflict: other communist 
inspired guerrillas including the Ejercito de Liberation Nacional (ELN), leftist urban 
student-led insurgents such as the Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), and right-wing 
paramilitary groups that found their zenith under the umbrella organization of the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Whether they are understood as directly 
participating in the civil war, or simply contributing to the larger panorama of violence, 
criminal organizations such as the Medellín and Cali Cartels grew to a size and power 
that rivaled both guerrilla and paramilitary organizations. Increasingly, the lines between 
these organizations have continued to blur as they have splintered and become more 
widespread. 
 The 2005 census claims a total population of 41,468,384 with over a million Indigenous (3.4%) and over 9
four million Afro-Colombian (10.6%) persons (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 
2011). These figures reflect the extension of “ethnic rights” in the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and 
Law 70 of 1993, which created strict criteria for the identification of these groups tied to specific notions 
of cultural authenticity and difference including language, dress, food, and musical traditions. The 
“ethnicization” of difference in Colombia through a multicultural framework has had important and 
ambivalent effects in social movements for racial justice (Restrepo, 2004). Anthropologists have a 
complex and problematic role as state sanctioned experts endowed with the power to legally certify an 
ethnic group, thereby controlling communities’ access to legal rights to land and autonomy (Paschel, 
2016). 
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Scope of the Civil War 
 The work of writing the history of the conflict, indeed, the work of memory which 
communities insist on as they have called for an end to violence, a space of healing and 
reparation, and a sense of justice, has been contemporaneous to the conflict itself (Alcalá 
& Uribe, 2016). Despite these herculean efforts, we are still often left to describe the 
effects of the war in broad strokes, forming a vague outline. “Basta Ya!”, the general 
report of the National Center for Historical Memory, an institution founded as a 
requirement of the “Peace and Justice” Process, reports that over 220,000 victims lost 
their lives to the conflict since 1958 (2016, p. 16).  Of those, 81.5%, the overwhelming 10
majority, were civilians.  To that number we must add military and paramilitary 11
strategies intended, at least in part, to reduce the apparent number of casualties, including 
25,007 victims of enforced disappearance and 2,701 victims of “false positives”(2016, p. 
69, p. 185).   12
Though the state’s Sole Registry of Victims (RUV) counts more than 4.7 million 
forcibly displaced persons as of 2013 in its database, official records on displacement 
only began to be recorded in 1997 with the passing of Law 387 which sought to 
implement measures to protect against forced displacement and mediate its effects. 
 The 2005 “Justice and Peace Law” ostensibly demobilized paramilitary forces and provided a 10
framework for truth, accountability, and reparation. Its effectiveness is contested by human rights groups 
who point to the reorganization of paramilitary structures, the growth of right wing armed militias, and 
ongoing violence, including the targeting of human rights defenders and social leaders by these groups 
(Saffron & Uprimny, 2007).
 The figures presented in this report draw upon the Register Único de Víctimas (RUV, The Sole Register 11
of Victims) among other state and civil society sources. The RUV was created by the 2011 Victims Law 
(Law 1448) “as a mechanism to guarantee the care and effective reparation of victims”(Centro Nacional 
de Memoria Histórica, 2016, p.38).
 See Definition of Terms and Acronyms on page 32.12
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Projections based on historical records and available archives lead the authors of the 
report to place the figure around 5,700,00, or 15% of the Colombian population (2016, 
p.40).  Other widespread and grave violations of human rights include acts of gendered 13
and sexualized violence, torture, forced recruitment including of minors as child soldiers, 
arbitrary detention, abduction, as well restrictions on civil liberties including the vitiation 
of due process, the restriction of free movement, and limitations on the right to participate 
freely in political processes.  At times, and in particular locations, these crimes have 14
been routinized, contouring life and making the negotiation of violence a quotidian act of 
survival.  
 Vulnerable groups have borne a greater share of this burden. As the war 
expanded, it did so into so-called ethnic communities, a political and legal term which 
includes Indigenous communities/reservations and Afro-Colombian populations.  This 15
expansion resulted in a disproportionate effect on these communities, as racism and 
neglect allowed for violence to be under-reported and under-addressed by state 
institutions and national media. Given the rural and often precarious situation these 
communities endured before and during the war, the loss of life and mass displacement 
 The  Global Report on Internal Displacement, a joint report by the Norwegian Refugee Council and 13
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre published in 2017, places the figure at 7.2 million. This makes 
Colombia the nation with the highest number of Internally Displaced Persons in the world, though they 
warn that this may be an overestimation. The UNHRC, in its 2016 Global Report, affirms that Colombia 
has the largest number of Internally Displaced Persons, placing the figure at 7.4 million. It reports that 
over two thirds of these persons are indigenous, with the remaining third comprised principally of Afro-
Colombian and campesino farmers (p. 65).
 I draw a distinction here against enforced disappearance whereby abduction is committed by a non-14
state actor without the participation, complicity, or acquiescence of the state. See Definition of Terms and 
Acronyms for further elaboration.
 See entry for Ethnic Rights in Definition of Terms and Acronyms on page 30.15
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from their lands have threatened cultural survival. Afro-Colombian and Indigenous 
advocacy groups report that paramilitary groups targeted ancestral practices in the course 
of the conflict, destroying traditional agricultural lands, denying the right to public 
assembly necessary for ceremonies, including those of mourning, and targeting elders and 
spiritual leaders for assassination. According to the Organización Nacional Indígena de 
Colombia (ONIC), 102 distinct Indigenous communities face extinction with 32 groups 
having fewer than 500 members (GHM, 2016).  
 Of those affected by the armed conflict, women have been particularly and 
egregiously affected. As men roughly account for ninety percent of casualties of the 
armed conflict, women have been forced to become heads of households, often left as the 
sole financial support for their families, while also seeking accountability and reparation 
through state and international mechanisms (Sánchez Gómez, 2008). Taking on these 
burdens often meant exposing themselves and their remaining family to dangerous 
visibility as they endured long exhausting days of travel pursuing legal and administrative 
procedures that increased their vulnerability to violent repression and abuse by armed 
groups and state officials (GHM, 2016). Their roles as advocates and social leaders in 
their communities have led to their increased targeting for assassination. “Basta Ya!” also 
recognizes that gendered and sexualized violence in the context of armed conflict aims at 
“punishing and instilling regimes of control… teaches lessons, sows terror and forces 
unarmed civilians to comply with certain role and behavioral codes imposed by armed 
actors” (GHM, 2016, p. 317). Sexual violence as a weapon of war can be attributed to 
members of all armed groups, including the Armed Forces of Colombia, and includes 
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sexual slavery, sexual torture, forced abortions, and rape (Centro Nacional de Memoria 
Histórica, 2017). While young women and girls were the principal targets of these acts, 
sexual violence permeated the war, affecting persons of all genders (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2017). Gendered violence, seeking to regulate gendered and sexual 
norms functioned as a “consolidation of a moral order, which coincides with 
heteronormativity, in its effort to punish, correct, or expel those persons which live 
outside of this norm” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015, p. 431).  Despite 16
national changes in recent years that have extended legal protection to LGBT persons in 
Colombia; guerrilla, paramilitary, and state forces have all participated in acts of sexual 
and heteronormative violence against them. Furthermore, heteronormative violence 
perpetrated by non-participants of the armed conflict, local communities and individuals, 
was exacerbated by the heightened regulation of the “moral order” with the presence of 
armed groups (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015, p. 432).  
 Community leaders and human rights groups have worked to document 
violations, rebuild community support networks, and seek restitution, often in the face of 
direct threats and targeted assassinations. Despite the efforts of local communities and a 
series of national initiatives for humanitarian assistance, restitution, and justice, local 
leaders assert that state response has, when present, been minimal and inappropriate in 
addressing the aftermath of human rights violations. All states, as arbiters of justice 
within the nation, have the legal obligation to ensure the rights of its citizens and must be 
held to a higher standard than non-state groups. In its war against the FARC, the 
 My translation.16
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Colombian state has the added responsibility of being directly and indirectly responsible 
for the great majority of grave human rights violations. For example, of the 1,982 
massacres documented by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 58.9% were 
perpetrated by paramilitary forces, and 7.9% are attributable to the Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016). Similarly, for selective 
assassinations, which account for the great majority of casualties in the conflict, 
paramilitary groups were positively identified as the perpetrators in 38.4% of cases, the 
Armed Forces in 10.01%, and joint paramilitary and Armed Forces operations in an 
additional 0.4% of cases (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016). This last figure, 
while a small percentage, points to the long-standing nexus of paramilitary and state 
forces. While paramilitary groups are, under any measure, responsible for the great 
majority of deaths, forced displacement, enforced disappearance, and other acts of 
brutality including torture, dismemberment, and sexual and gendered violence, they often 
committed these acts with the participation, consent, or acquiescence of Colombian 
Security Forces and state officials. Indirect participation included offering logistical 
support, silencing dissent, and omitting facts in their reporting (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2016). 
  While the anti-paramilitary decrees of 1989 reversed a legal framework legalizing 
and encouraging the growth of paramilitary units, the phenomena reached its pinnacle in 
the early 2000s.  Since then, there have been waves of accountability in which state 
investigators have slowly revealed links between the government, paramilitary 
organizations, and their violent acts. The para-politics scandals, as they are known in 
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Colombia, continue today, threatening to implicate an ever-greater number of political 
figures in paramilitary violence (Alsema, 2012). In 2005, Alvaro Uribe’s government, 
facing increasing pressure from international human rights organizations, including the 
International Criminal Court, as well as the U.S. Congress, culminated ongoing 
negotiations with the AUC with the passage of the so-called Justice and Peace Law, Law 
975. This law established minimal institutional mechanisms for victims to claim rights 
under a much larger process of paramilitary demobilization and truth tribunals. The law 
has been widely criticized for the incomplete and at times fraudulent demobilization of 
paramilitary forces. Three years after the implementation of the law, only 24 victims had 
successfully received damages (Summers, 2012). A joint report from the United Nations 
and Colombia’s Ministry of Justice from 2016 declared that less than 4% of entitled 
victims received any reparations (Martínez Sánchez, 2016). As of 2015, paramilitary 
soldiers had confessed to over 70,000 crimes; yet only 37 convictions have been 
successfully prosecuted under the law (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The focus on the 
creation of justice mechanisms under the peace accord has further burdened judicial 
systems further slowing prosecutions under the Justice and Peace Law. 
 Despite the clear limitations of Law 975, it has deeply affected civil society in 
Colombia and is frequently cited as the first transitional justice effort in the country 
(Rowen, 2016; Saffron & Uprimny 2007; Sandvik & Lemaitre, 2015). By creating the 
legal category of Victim of the Armed Conflict, the law was instrumental in providing 
legitimization and institutional support for victims’ organizations. Victimized-survivors 
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of the conflict have taken on this new legal category as a platform from which to 
advocate for justice and restitution.  
 Yet, in the years leading up to and immediately following Law 975, the conflict 
evolved and escalated as armed struggle for control of territory became increasingly tied 
to economic interests. Forcibly taken lands were used for drug production and trafficking 
and, more recently, for mineral extraction and large-scale agriculture (AI, 2014). 
International corporations, financial elite, and government officials have been implicated 
in the widespread expropriation of land by armed groups resulting in the dispossession of 
over 13.3 million acres - or about 14% of Colombia’s territory (Amnesty International, 
2014; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Summers, 2012). In Colombia, economic interest in 
the context of armed conflict has resulted in the dramatic concentration of land resulting 
in the most unequal distribution in Latin America, where 1.15% of landowners own 
52.2% of arable land (Summers, 2012). 
 The effects of past and ongoing violence determine life for many Colombians as 
they work for peaceful and just mechanisms of accountability and reparation. The Peace 
Accord contributes to a robust but complicated panorama of past agreements, laws, and 
judicial and executive decrees, creating a large, confusing, and unevenly distributed 
system of transitional justice. Victimized-survivors of the armed conflict 
disproportionately assume responsibility for implementing these systems, often with 
serious lack of institutional support and financial resources. This study, in conducting 
grounded and participatory research, addresses the complexity of transitional justice in 
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Colombia, its uneven implementation, and points to the transformation and persistence of 
violence in Colombia for communities most affected by the armed conflict. 
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Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of organizers, 
advocates, and victims’ representatives in mechanisms for participation in 
transitional justice in a conflicted democracy (Aoláin & Campbell, 2005; Chatterji 
et al., 2016).  My research included in-depth interviews with members of Victims’ 
Mesas, at the municipal, departmental and national levels, as well as participatory 
work with CEPO, El Centro de Estudios Politicos,  an organizing and research 17
collective dedicated to expanding democratic participation in Colombia. It 
documents local knowledge of these key stakeholders to offer a grounded critique 
of participation in transitional justice in Colombia.  
Theoretical Framework 
 In its widest sense, the notion of governmentality, as introduced by Michel 
Foucault (2007), describes the techniques of government aimed at managing 
population and its resources. In particular, governmentality refers to: The 
“ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations and tactics” which allow the exercise of power (in its governmental 
form) where the target of power is a population and the primary form of 
knowledge it employs is political economy with “the apparatus of security as its 
essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2007, p. 108). 
 See Chapter Three for a description of CEPO and their work.17
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 Analysis of governmentality by Foucault and others has been primarily 
focused on neoliberal governments and their biopolitical practices (Brown, 2017; 
Cotoi, 2011; Foucault, 2008; Restrepo, 2004).  This conception of neoliberal 1819
governmentality posits the maximization of resources and the subjectification of 
populations towards the liberalization of economy and the securitization of nation 
as the key-organizing principles of government. These are biopolitical regimes in 
so far as governments seek to manage populations through their categorization, 
divisions that produce manageable units through social discourses that affix their 
supposed value or threat to the larger nation-state (Foucault, 2008; Restrepo, 
2004). Subjectification describes the process through which individuals and 
communities come to internalize (wholly or partially) these biopolitical identities. 
 While the theorization of governmentality has largely been limited to 
stable, so-called advanced democracies, I argue that this theory is helpful in 
understanding the experience of Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and campesino 
 Wendy Brown in a recent work, argues that neoliberalism is not simply an economic model but a form 18
of rationality that extends the logic of financial markets to all aspects of life, undermining democracy 
(2017). In an interview on her work she states, “I treat neoliberalism as a governing rationality through 
which everything is “economized” and in a very specific way” (Brown & Shenk, 2017). Unlike 
liberalism, neoliberal rationality reduces human value to its commodification and speculation, rendering 
formerly political and social spheres to mere economic rationality. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, makes a 
similar point when discussing the Colombian Peace Accord, arguing that its success in creating conditions 
for a lasting peace are dependent on a commitment to a “Democratic Peace” over a “Neoliberal Peace” 
(2017).
 The question of the biopolitical is a site of contention across the humanities and social sciences. I 19
understand it as the management of life and death, towards the subjectification of individuals in the 
management of populations. Here, various and contradictory techniques of government, including those 
grounded in medicine, pedagogy, policing and security, are aimed at both individuals and larger 
collectives, seeking to have them internalize particular relations of power to produce certain social 
behaviors. Thus techniques which produce exclusion and death are no less biopolitical, in that such acts of 
state sanctioned violence seek to communicate to larger communities particular understandings of 
national belonging and what is deemed appropriate and acceptable (political) behavior.
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communities as they live within and against imposed identities manufactured by 
the state and contend with a political economy seeking their literal and figurative 
displacement. Neoliberal economics, elaborated by national and multinational 
elites, place the development and exploitation of ‘national’ resources as central to 
the economic and political security of the nation-state. Afro-Colombian, 
Indigenous, and campesino  advocates refuse this claim, documenting and 20
denouncing the ways in which large-scale efforts at resource extraction and 
production have resulted in an escalation of political violence, a vitiation of 
traditional economies of subsistence, and have thus threatened both economic and 
cultural survival.  A critical examination of Colombian governmentality not only 
provides a context for understanding the armed conflict in Colombia, but also 
affords key insight into the possibilities and limits of transitional justice as these 
processes seek an expansion of neoliberal economic rationales while attempting to 
address widespread human rights violations. Furthermore, it offers an 
understanding of the limits and apparent failures of mechanisms of participation 
and human rights despite their strong legal foundation and discursive support by 
state and international officials. This approach is necessary against a backdrop of 
certain threads of human rights scholarship, including that of human rights 
education, that in its universalist and legalistic forms, uncritically assumes a 
 I use campesino, which may roughly translate to peasant, in keeping with its Colombian usage 20
describing rural land working communities. Campesino is a racially ambiguous term, used, as I do above, 
to name those not categorized as, nor perhaps self-identified with, the “ethnicized” terms Afro-Colombian 
and Indigenous, but who share a dependence on land for self-subsistence and cultural reproduction. In 
Colombia, the terms Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and campesino, are often used to name communities 
fighting for territorial rights.
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progressive and invariably beneficial outcome to human rights norms, transitional 
justice mechanisms, and victims’ participation (Zembylas, 2016).  
 Between law as norm and the possibilities of communities’ and civil 
society’s resistance to state neglect and violence lies a complex and dynamic 
relation. The implementation of counter-insurgency policy in Colombia, itself an 
extension of emergency rule established during the half-a-century-long civil war, 
conflates images of liberal politicians, guerrilla insurgents, Marxist students, and 
campesino, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian movements for land and autonomy 
(Franco Restrepo 2009). As law categorized citizens as threats or possible threats 
to the nation, civil society and local communities were often compelled to 
reproduce the exclusion of dangerous others through a refusal to document, 
denounce, and seek justice for state violations of political and human rights. This 
was effected through fear of legal and extra-legal reprisal, including extra-judicial 
execution and enforced disappearance, and the establishment of a dominant/
majority assumption that victims of state (and para-state) violence are at least 
partially guilty, if not of specific crimes, then of a subversive political subjectivity 
that either outright legitimizes or minimally explains their targeting. 
 Through international pressure, there has been a shift in Colombian state 
discourse acknowledging the systematic violation of human rights over the past 
60 years (Tate, 2007). Yet such discourse, produced through varied and 
conflicting bureaucratic agencies, often refuses an acknowledgment of state 
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violence and complicity in paramilitary violence. In producing the category of 
‘new criminal organizations’ (BACRIM, Nuevas Bandas Criminales) for still 
intact and functioning paramilitary units classified as demobilized, the state 
expunges recent history that establishes the legal and political continuities 
between paramilitary organization, funding, arming, and deployment and state 
support/initiation of these activities. 
 Human rights processes and discourse have been, at least partially, 
subverted to continue the marginalization of political dissidents, conflating armed 
insurgency, criminal (paramilitary and narco-traffic) organizations, and non-
violent dissent, often targeting communities denouncing state violence. The 
dominant deployment of human rights law and discourse in Colombia today 
reinscribes the image of “other” as threat to security and nation, while providing a 
response to regional and international human rights bodies calling for an end to 
state violence and the implementation of processes of truth, justice, and reparation 
(Franco Restrepo, 2009).  Not only must a subject produce itself as deserving of 21
human and political rights in alignment with national interests, but the desire for 
 I use “other” here in the political and philosophical sense. It is an “other” to the “self” of the normative 21
structure of governance, the target of policies intended to maximize life and its potential of capitalist 
productivity. It is the “other” to the subject of dominant History, the story of civilization that privileges 
western reason, history, economy, and subjectivity. In Colombia, the “other” in this case, are those 
marginalized racially, sexually, economically, and politically: Indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities, organized workers and campesinos, dissident students, and others involved in organizing 
for human rights and the basic needs of their communities. 
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such ‘being’ must also be internalized and performed through social acts of 
allegiance and acquiescence.  22
 This discursive apparatus continues to divide Colombian society and 
threatens to derail the transitional justice process. It justifies the neglect of 
communities deeply affected by the conflict, despite robust jurisprudence 
establishing the state’s responsibility to ensure rights to truth, justice, restitution, 
and non-repetition. Furthermore, the discursive production of victimized-
survivors of human rights violations as threats to national security and economic 
development, inhibits the implementation of transitional justice and permits the 
continued violation of communities and their territories through extra-legal 
means. It is in this context that appeals to participation in transitional justice 
mechanisms find their real limits, and through which participants face deeply 
ambivalent experiences.  
Research Questions 
 Following from my research objectives, the following research questions 
guided my inquiry. The first two dig into the broader contexts of Transitional 
justice and Participation, offering a way to approach the relationship between both 
and the experiences of participants themselves. My last question leads towards the 
 “Being” here reveals the phenomenological roots to the discourse on the “other” in post-structural and 22
post-colonial thought from which my arguments come. “Being” in this context, refers to the ways of life 
organized in congruence or in resistance to dominant governance and neoliberal rationality. 
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conclusion of this dissertation, asking the theoretical and practical implications 
for Transitional justice Studies, and human rights advocacy more broadly. 
1. Structures of Participation: What are key structures for victims’ 
participation in transitional justice in Colombia? What are their legal 
foundation? Who are participants in their bodies and what power do they 
have to affect the larger peace process? 
2. Participation in Action: What have been the experiences of participants in 
these transitional justice mechanisms for participation?  What have been 
the limits to their effective participation? What has their participation 
made possible?  
3. Participation in Transitional justice Studies: What do the experiences and 
perspectives of Colombian participants in transitional justice mechanisms 
offer to scholars and advocates of Transitional justice?  
The first two questions are addressed thoroughly by my findings in Chapters 4 
and 5. Both of these chapters examine laws and institutions directly related to 
legal rights for participation, particularly in transitional justice. Chapter 4 
examines the constitutional basis of participation, as well as Law 434, which 
established the Peace Councils. These councils are an early form of participation 
in peace processes, and are described in this chapter. Chapter 4 continues by 
drawing from interviews conducted on a pilot study to address issues with 
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participation and the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Chapter 
5 picks up where Chapter 4 leaves off, addressing more recent legal and 
institutional mechanisms for participation. The chapter weaves in narratives from 
participant observation and interviews to ground my findings in the experiences 
of victims’ organizers and advocates participating in the mesas, a mechanism for 
participation established by law 1448 and built upon by the Peace Accord.  
 I examine my third research question in my concluding Chapter 6. Here I 
link the critiques of participation and the implementation of transitional justice 
mechanisms offered by community members and victims’ representatives to 
larger questions for Transitional justice Studies, calling for an approach that 
recognizes the limits of participation in addressing issues inherent to Transitional 
justice and the problematics of neoliberal bio-political governance in securing a 
just, equitable, and sustained peace.  
Delimitations and Limitations 
 This study is delimited by a set of specific choices. First, I have chosen to 
conduct my research in two overlapping phases. In collaboration with CEPO, I 
conducted participatory research, supporting their development of a research 
protocol to investigate the implementation of the Peace Accord in the Urabá 
region of Antioquia while learning from their work in creating Peace Boards for 
local participation. In the second phase I interviewed representatives of Victims’ 
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Mesas and other civil society advocates, and participated in a series of events 
offering participatory spaces for victimized-survivors of the armed conflict.   23
 My interviews focused on the experiences of participants in transitional 
justice mechanisms, many of whom survived human rights violations and have 
sought accountability and restitution since the time of the violation. The 
interviews at times necessarily involved reference to specific events in their 
personal histories, yet interviews did not undertake a recording of in-depth 
testimonies of violations.  While counseling and legal support was made available 
as necessary through allied organizations, such testimonies were beyond the scope 
of my study. Furthermore, given participants’ experience with human rights work, 
including being well versed in discussing their personal context for the work, no 
persons interviewed accepted my offer for referral to psycho-social services.  
Instead, my interviews focused on their understanding of and experiences in 
transitional justice structures for participation, principally CEPO members’ 
experiences with organizing Peace Councils across Antioquia, and members of 
various Victims’ Mesas. As such, this study did not include a detailed history of 
the conflict, though I provide relevant context on the history of the armed conflict. 
Furthermore, this study is not comparative and as such will only include passing 
mention to other events in recent Colombian and international history.  
 The two phases of this research were conducted in March and April of 2018. While the first phase was 23
conducted primarily in March and the second in April, there was a degree of overlap.
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 Important limitations included financial and time constraints associated 
with my travel and stay in Colombia. My professional and personal circumstances 
required that I conduct my research over a three-month period. While this is a 
relatively brief period in which to address the research questions I proposed, my 
experience in Colombia over many trips and years and previously established 
relationships to community organizations made this timeline viable. 
  Lastly, there are important safety concerns that affected my travel. Many  
regions in Colombia continue to be under threat by paramilitary successor groups 
that have only expanded since the start of the Peace Process between the FARC 
and the state. Human rights advocates, including some whom I interviewed, have 
received threats that limited their availability and need for limited visibility. 
Situating the Self in the Context of the Research 
 This dissertation represents a network of relationships and experiences 
that have defined more than a decade of work in solidarity with those struggling 
for peace and justice in Colombia. Though the work of my mentor, Dr. Angana 
Chatterji, I was lucky enough to attend the Second World Congress on 
Psychosocial Work in Exhumation Processes, Forced Disappearance, Justice, and 
Truth at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá, Colombia in 2010 where she 
presented on the findings of “Buried Evidence: Unknown, Unmarked, and Mass 
Graves in Indian-administered Kashmir” and participated in the drafting of 
international norms for psychosocial support. There, alongside my colleague 
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Heidi Rhodes, we met leaders from the Asociación Renacer Siglo XXI, including 
Hector Marino Carabalí, its co-founder and legal representative. This 
organization, formed in 2001, in the aftermath of a violent decade’s long 
paramilitary incursion, was the first of its kind in Northern Cauca.  
 Through this amazing network, we helped to document cases of enforced 
disappearance in Northern Cauca, wrote a report on those cases that was 
presented internationally, arranged a solidarity speaking tour in the United States, 
and organized a campaign for the protection of human rights advocates threatened 
by paramilitary violence, including securing international grants for their 
temporary relocation and supporting asylum processes. These experiences, 
reflected upon through these crucial relationships, represent my understanding of 
the Colombian conflict and the efforts of victimized-survivors to document 
violations, expand spaces of democratic participation, and call for and work 
towards peace, justice, and reparation.  
 Despite this immersion, I am and will continue to be an outsider to 
Colombia, and in particular to those communities most affected by the armed 
conflict. I am aware, as are those whom I collaborated with and interviewed, that 
our experiences related to the work we are discussing are separated by very real 
differences. I am a visitor to Colombia, someone who has not lived for a 
prolonged period under the effects of armed conflict, and who, with a U.S. 
American passport in hand, could leave freely at my own discretion. Despite 
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meaningful political commitments, my work in Colombia has always been a 
choice made through the relative safety of graduate studies and international 
travel. This choice is one not available to many of the participants of this study 
driven to do their work given the often painful circumstances of their personal 
lives. I state these differences clearly, as they are important in understanding the 
perspective I offer, and the contexts that have influenced the meaningful 
relationships I have built with Colombian human rights defenders and social 
leaders. I believe that in this case, this difference has the potential to be 
productive allowing for a cross-cultural and international collaboration that seeks 
to leverage relative privilege towards accountability in Transitional justice as it is 
both understood by scholars and implemented by international advocates. 
Definition of Terms and Acronyms 
AUC: The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) 
was the largest paramilitary organization in Colombian history. An umbrella organization 
that integrated various other paramilitary forces, their bloques (squadrons) came to 
occupy large tracts of land across the entire territory of Colombia. A demobilization 
process that began in 2006 under the “Justice and Peace Law” 974, led to the dismantling 
of the AUC and to testimonies by former paramilitary soldiers in exchange for amnesty 
that has given us a partial record of the history of paramilitary human rights violations. 
The demobilizations are critically understood to be incomplete as so called “New 
Criminal Bands” (BACRIM), also named paramilitary successor groups, continue to 
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target human rights advocates and community leaders with assassination and 
disappearance.  24
ELN: The Ejercito de Liberation Nacional (National Liberation Army) is now, following 
the demobilization of the FARC, Colombia’s largest insurgent armed force. A Marxist-
Leninist insurgency, it began in 1964, and had strong ties to liberation theology. At its 
height it had over 5,000 soldiers though their number today is believed to be under 2,000 
(Torres, 2017). They are currently in peace talks with the Colombian government in 
Ecuador, and a temporary ceasefire has been in place since October 1, 2017.  
Enforced Disappearance:  According to the Rome Statute, Enforced Disappearance is to 
be understood as “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the 
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by 
a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or 
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of 
the law for a prolonged period of time” (UN General Assembly, 1998, p. 5). It has also 
been codified as a grave violation of human rights by the United Nations’ International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED) and 
the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention on the Forced 
Disappearance of Persons. The generally accepted history of the definition and 
criminalization of enforced disappearance traces its emergence to movements for 
accountability to its widespread use by the authoritarian regimes of Latin America in the 
latter part of the twentieth century. There are alternative histories in which scholars point 
 Following Colombian social leaders and human rights advocates, I will refer to BACRIM simply as 24
paramilitary forces.
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to a longer history including the Third Reich’s use of Enforced Disappearance in its Night 
and Fog program and the application of existing international law in prosecuting those 
responsible for the program during the Nuremberg Tribunals (Finucane, 2010). Noche y 
Niebla, a publication by The Center for Research and Popular Education, is a quarterly 
catalogue of human rights violations in Colombia. The title is a nod to the history of the 
Nazi program.  
Ethnic Rights: The 1991 Constitution of Colombia, itself the product of a constitutional 
assembly that was formed as part of a peace accord between the government and several 
guerrilla organizations, most prominently the M-19, provided collective rights to 
ancestrally held lands for Indigenous groups, the right to prior consultation on 
development projects that affect their communities, reservations for political 
participation, and the right to limited self-governance (Semper, 2006). Law 70 of 1993 
extended these rights to Afro-Colombian communities who met certain requirements 
under the law, introducing the concept of a Consejo Communitiario (Community 
Council) as the subject of collective Afro-Colombian rights (Paschel, 2016). Due to the 
strict system of state authorization of Consejo Communitiarios, many are in a 
indeterminate state of approval and are known as Procesos Comunitarios (community 
processes), this self-identification functions as both political reminder and metaphor for 
the unfinished process of ensuring Afro-Colombian rights.  
False Positives: False positives, also known as fake encounter killings, are cases in 
which the Armed Forces of Colombia committed extrajudicial executions of civilians and 
then documented the killing as (in the language of the state) a positive: a neutralized 
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guerrilla insurgent. This tactic included the planting of evidence in the form of guns, 
munitions, and went as far as dressing buddies of the deceased in guerrilla fatigues. 
Pressure from military command structures contributed to these killings as subaltern units 
were pressured to produce increasing numbers of kills (Alston, 2010). Such pressure 
took, at times, the form of incentives such as promotions, raises, and extended leaves of 
absence. Though investigations of these acts are still underway, by 2011 the state 
prosecutor had investigated 1486 cases involving 2701 victims (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2016, pp. 185). 
FARC: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (The Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia) was the largest and longest running insurgency in the Western 
Hemisphere. It declared itself in 1964, from what had been 33 separate militias fleeing 
persecution by military forces. Its disarmament was declared complete by the United 
Nations Mission to Colombia on September 22, 2017 (UNMC, 2017). A small minority 
of FARC commands refused to disarm and participate in the Peace Accord, these groups 
have reconstituted as FARC dissidents. The persecution of demobilized soldiers, as well 
as persisting conditions of poverty and marginalization, have led to the increase in size of 
these dissident groups. They have not, as of yet, reconstituted as a national organization. 
RUV: The Register Único de Víctimas (The Sole Register of Victims) was created by the 
2011 Victims Law (Law 1448) “as a mechanism to guarantee the care and effective 
reparation of victims” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016, p.38). It is the 
state’s most comprehensive database of victims of the armed conflict and human rights 
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violations. It largely depends on self-reporting of “victims,” subject to verification by the 
Register, and is a requirement of application for state restitution and aid. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Introduction to Transitional justice 
 In the growing and disparate field of literature and social, legal, and 
political practice known as Transitional justice, no single definition encompasses 
the multiplicity of theoretical perspectives or political initiatives. In the widely 
accepted toolbox approach, it may be understood as a set of mechanisms: truth 
tribunals and commissions, prosecutions, memorialization, amnesty, as well as 
projects for reparation and reconciliation (Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan, 2010). More 
broadly, it may be defined as an approach to ensuring basic rights in addressing 
mass violations of human rights, rights to truth, justice, reparation, and non-
repetition during periods of political transition (Saffon & Uprimny, 2007). Its 
discourses are recognized and reproduced through international law, human rights 
organizations, state institutions, and civil society groups. Increasingly, there are 
academic departments, conferences, and journals dedicated to its study and 
development (Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan, 2010). Transitional justice is an 
expanding but contested field, still under creation and revision. It is a discursive 
site where individual and group actors stake claims to particular visions, 
aspirations, and futures, mediated by a particular social and political position and 
at times in contradiction to each other’s assertions. Transitional justice is where 
abstract legal and political theory meets its instrumentalization in law and 
practice, with important effects for those left vulnerable by political violence and 
armed conflict. 
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Truth and Justice 
 While questions on the origin of transitional justice may be debated by 
scholars interested in fixing a particular identity for its conceptualization and 
implementation, its gradual consolidation as theory and practice evolved in 
response to critical reflection on relatively recent historical events. In addition to 
post-Soviet contexts, the experiences of Latin American states, particularly 
Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, figure significantly in the development of 
Transitional justice (Hinton, 2011; Teitel, 2000). These countries, whose leftist, 
dissident, Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities endured mass violations 
of human rights committed by military governments who had overthrown liberal 
democracies in the name of cold war security, followed somewhat similar 
trajectories in their transition to a political state of nominal democracy.  25
Transitional justice, in its formation in these contexts, evolved from mass 
participation in social movements and international pressure.  Amnesty was 
favored over prosecutions, as jurists and researchers participating in truth 
commissions documented the scope of atrocities committed, at times in the face 
of violent threats (Teitel, 2000).  Drastic economic changes, which were pushed 26
through under emergency rule, were continued or expanded under new dubiously 
  The United States of America figures prominently in these histories, offering various forms of political, 25
military, and intelligence support to these coup d’etat. 
 The National Commission on the Disappeared, in Argentina, which documented the forced 26
disappearance of over 30,000 people under the Argentine dictatorship, is a standout example of such truth 
process both in terms of their value and their limits (Hinton, 2011).
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elected governments.  Despite the inability of these new governments to address 27
the crimes of the previous regimes and, perhaps most consequentially, the effects 
of mass violence and physical and economic displacement, a paradigmatic 
framework had been established.  Transition, the shift from military and/or 
authoritarian rule, to liberal democracy, no matter how minimal in its guarantee of 
basic rights or in its political representation of the majority of its citizens, became 
paramount in these processes (Teitel, 2000). Subsequent critiques sought to 
address the issue of impunity in political transitions creating crucial debates 
between models that alternatively emphasized ‘truth’ or ‘justice’, dovetailing into 
larger human rights debates on ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ (Hinton, 2011). Scholars 
critical of legalistic approaches that prioritized accountability under international 
law over questions of peace and stability in political transitions emphasized the 
use of truth tribunals to symbolically address the past and seek reconciliation 
between communities.  The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
is seen as paradigmatic of this approach (Teitel, 2000). 
 Legal scholars, emphasizing the normative functions of transitional 
processes, sought to ensure that international legal standards were followed, 
thereby helping to establish criminal accountability and the strengthening of 
human rights law and mechanisms. The late 1990s witnessed a swing towards 
accountability with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
 These neoliberal reforms included widespread privatization, austerity in the form of cuts to, or total 27
annihilation of, social programs including health and education, and the dependence on a debt economy in 
the name of economic growth. 
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). Both of these Tribunals 
initiated mechanisms now associated with transitional justice while prosecuting 
large numbers of human rights perpetrators. The International Criminal Court, 
established under the Rome Statute of 1998, is also representative of an 
accountability approach to addressing mass human rights violations in nations 
unable to prosecute powerful perpetrators of human rights through their own 
judicial systems.  
Time 
  In Transitional Justice Genealogy, Ruti Teitel, who has been cited as 
having coined the term, asserted that, “Transitional justice can be defined as the 
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by 
legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” 
(Teitel, 2002, p. 25). The substantive emphasis in this definition is on righting 
wrongs, specifically in the addressing of past human rights violations.  
The goals of Transitional justice are fundamentally tied to the aspiration of 
transition, both towards justice for past violations and towards a 
cementing of a new political order that will prevent the old order, with its 
attendant human rights violations, from returning. (Iverson, 2014, p 85) 
Here the question of temporality, implicit in understandings of transition, is made 
explicit. Transition evokes a temporality, a movement from the past, into the 
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future. The definitions offered by Iverson and Teitel, extend this temporality by 
giving it a linear and progressive structure, Transitional justice is thus the  
progressive movement in time towards justice and accountability and away from 
illegality (Aoláin & Campbel, 2005). Postcolonial critics, and anthropologists in 
particular, have cautioned us against implicit teleological bias (Hinton, 2011).  
The End of History, a teleological goal recognized by its universality and linear 
trajectory, risks becoming the logic of transitional justice.  Critics have rightly 28
argued that such approaches may reproduce a colonial logic, locating primitivity 
or savagery in the organization of non-democratic regimes, even as liberal 
democracies justify violence (against its own citizens and residents, and those 
beyond its borders) as acts towards the defense of their democracies and the 
evolution of an underdeveloped world needing their guidance (Chatterji et al., 
2016; Foucault et al., 2003; Restrepo, 2011).  Time, in a sense, is compressed, as 29
long and complex histories of conflict are reduced to the violence of specific and 
recent events. The toolbox approach to transitional justice may then be understood 
as a simple application of prescribed solutions, a fix to an otherwise broken 
 Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the Last Man”, published in 1992, following the collapse 28
of these South American dictatorships and witnessing the end of the Cold War, argues that Liberal 
Democracy represents the culmination of political evolution. As such, it represents the “End of History” 
as a history of political development, time becomes the only true impediment to the fulfillment of a 
colonial dream of global identity promising peace in the universal reflection of democratic values and 
institutions thought to be achieved by so-called advanced Western Democracies.
 It should be understood without saying that the very governments asserting the savagery of 29
undeveloped nations often actively and directly participated in their colonization and underdevelopment, 
at times instituting anti-democratic regimes in the name of their own economic and political interests. 
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society or failed state, to reproduce an order of justice already exemplified by 
Global North liberal states (Hinton, 2011; Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan 2010).  
 Postcolonial and feminist scholars of Transitional justice have argued for a 
different approach to time and history (Mibenge, 2013). Transitional justice, per 
their approach, cannot simply be the transition of a primitive state of violence to a 
replicable and already known system of liberal governance. Instead, it must also 
be transformative. Transformative justice, itself an emerging field within and 
against Transitional justice, seeks the transformation of law, institutions, and 
social relations in ways that address the root causes of conflict and both long 
standing and future inequities within society, even those irreducible to human 
right’s law (Chatterji et al., 2016; Daly, 2002). The relation to time, history, and 
memory necessarily changes through this approach as transitional and 
transformative justice must contend with “the present effects of the past as much 
as it is dynamically informed by commitments to the future” (Chatterji et al., 
2016, p. 59). Openness is key to this understanding. Transition, for it to be both 
meaningful for victimized-survivors of human rights violations, and 
transformative of governance, must be in creative and collaborative construction 
with those most marginalized by structures of state, economy, and society. 
Conflicted Democracy 
 Colombia, in its implementation of the Peace Accord and approach 
towards transitional justice, is acting on multiple registers. It has secured an end 
	 	 43
to the armed conflict with the country’s largest and longest-running insurgent 
force. In doing so, the government has committed itself to a process of political 
transition, to address past violence and guarantee against future violations, and to 
seek justice for human rights violations. The Peace Accord is not simply an 
addressing of the law of war, or even of the effects of war, but is ultimately a 
commitment to a “transition to a new regime of accountability for human rights 
abuses” and a social and political transformation that opens space for non-violent 
dissent and popular participation in governance while seeking to address the root 
causes of the conflict (Iverson, 2014, p. 90).  
 Yet, here we confront a contradiction. In most transitional justice 
processes, it is acknowledged that the former regime was authoritarian, non-
democratic, or at least so deeply compromised in its legal framework as to not 
meet the requirements of a nominal democracy (Aoláin & Campbel, 2005). 
Colombia, on the other hand, is one of the few Latin American states to have not 
seen a formal suspension of its democracy (Palacios, 2006). In asserting the right 
to negotiate with the FARC and implement the peace agreement, the government 
has sought to invoke democratic institutions. A constitutional amendment passed 
in 2012, established the legal right for the government to negotiate with the FARC 
and create a structure for transitional justice. The Peace Accord was originally put 
to a national plebiscite in October of 2016. Though voted down by a slim margin 
and with a minority of the population casting ballots, the agreement was 
renegotiated, taking into account the objections of the ‘No’ campaign, before 
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ultimately being ratified by Congress in November of that year.  The Accord’s 30
implementation continues to depend on Congress to draft laws in accordance with 
what was negotiated. By depending on its democratic institutions and creating a 
structure for institutional, social and political reform, the Colombian government 
is pursuing a strategy of complementarity, where transitional justice becomes 
integral to peacemaking (van Nievelt, 2016).  
 In successfully negotiating an end to the internal armed conflict with the 
FARC, the Colombian government under Santos gained international 
commendation for its commitment to peace, and for the strength of its democratic 
institutions. Yet, the war in Colombia continues. Other guerrilla groups and 
dissident former FARC factions persist in open conflict with military and 
paramilitary forces, competition for control of coca production and trafficking has 
increased violence in areas left vacant by the FARC, and international capital 
continues to be complicit in forced displacement and selective assassinations in 
energy, mining, and agricultural industries. Fundamentally, Colombia remains a 
deeply divided society with high rates of economic inequality, racial and gendered 
disparities, and corruption at all levels of government (Centro Nacional de 
 Much can and has been said about this plebiscite. Generally it is seen as a miscalculation by the Santos 30
administration, seeking confirmation of their approach through popular support. Its failure has been 
alternatively explained by storms keeping turnout low, a complex and compromised political system that 
depends on the local buying of votes, and the always present threat of political violence. 
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Memoria Histórica, 2016).  In stating that “Conflicted democracies in the Global 31
South may be characterized as political democracies that grapple with deep-rooted 
dissension born of political and ideological differences that are historical, ethnic, 
racial, economic, gendered, and religious in character”, the authors of Conflicted 
Democracies and Gendered Violence might as well be describing the root causes 
of the Colombian conflict (Chatterji et al, 2016, p. 20). These divisions, while 
constitutive of violence in Colombia, have not resulted in the total collapse of 
democratic institutions. As with other conflicted democracies, these institutions 
often manage to function sufficiently for a portion of the population, particularly 
for elites and the urban middle class, while failing to address the basic needs of 
marginalized communities (Chatterji et al., 2016, p. 21). The participation of the 
Armed Forces of Colombia in human rights violations and their complicity and 
collaboration with paramilitary groups in mass violence against campesino, 
Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities is testament to the uneven 
distribution of state support to all of Colombia’s peoples (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2016). Complicity in paramilitary and military violence 
extends to other institutions of governance as hundreds of national and local 
politicians have been implicated in political violence and human rights violations 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016). State and para-state violence 
 According to OXFAM, 80% of land in Colombia is in the hands of 14% of the land owners, and that 31
concentration has grown over the last 50 years (Gillan, 2015). According to the World Bank’s GINI index 
(the deviation of income in a country from a perfectly equal deviation), Colombia has the world’s 11th 
highest unequal distribution of income, and the 3rd highest in Latina America after Honduras and 
Surinam. See: https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings.
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becomes a mechanism of order and exclusion, facilitating access to resources that 
benefit ruling and ‘majoritarian’ classes while producing a national other defined 
as a threat to prosperity and stability (Chatterji et al., 2016; Franco Restrepo, 
2009). Majoritarian classes, in this usage, refers not to demography, but rather to a 
structure of national identity consolidated and reproduced by an elite class that 
positions its interests as national, and competing interests, such as ecological or 
economic sustainability or cultural survival, as anti-national. Counter-insurgency 
in Colombia is an explicit goal of governance, seeking to identify and punish 
those guilty of the political crime of insurgency. The nation’s others, defined vis a 
vis majoritarian nationalism, are often conflated with armed groups, legitimizing 
the use of violence against them and denying equal access to structures of justice 
and accountability. This logic extends to victims of state and paramilitary 
violence. In the logic of counter-insurgency, only subjects of guerrilla violence are 
rightly victims deserving of recognition and a fulfillment of their rights to truth, 
justice, reparation and non-repetition. Victims of state and paramilitary violence 
are conflated with guerrilla forces, either as disguised soldiers or willing 
collaborators. The state’s commitment to the participation of victims in 
transitional justice mechanisms runs afoul of the logic of counter-insurgency 
creating confusion and contradiction in state processes that are typical of 
conflicted democracies.  
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The Local 
 These questions on the accessibility of resources, state support, and 
structures of justice and accountability as well as the bifurcation of citizens 
between loyal and subversive subjects underlie current efforts towards transitional 
justice. The Peace Accord acknowledges the need to address these inequities and 
proposes structural changes directed towards lessening the deep divisions in 
Colombian society. Yet, political entrenchment, capital interests, and ongoing 
conflict threaten to derail its implementation. Understanding the needs and 
listening to the stories of those most proximate to violence, the victimized-
survivors of human rights violations, is crucial in highlighting the importance of 
the Peace Process and ensuring that it is implemented in ways that address the 
conditions that produce violence and instability in Colombia. 
 Indeed, victimized-survivors of the armed conflict have been at the center 
of advocating for the peace process from the beginning (Alcalá & Uribe, 2016; 
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2017). Participating actively in civil 
society and engaging with the state at all levels, victimized-survivors have 
propelled the movement for human rights and long called for peace, justice, and 
restitution. This constant pressure, channeled through regional, national, and 
international human rights groups, has compelled the government to respond 
through a series of legal initiatives and decrees that have created robust 
transitional justice jurisprudence. Under these laws and policies, “victim” has 
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become a legal category toward whom the state has particular responsibilities in 
ensuring restitution, protection, and participation. Yet, throughout the last decades 
of attempted peace negotiations, prior guerrilla and paramilitary demobilizations, 
and projects for restitution and guarantees of non-repetition, victims’ 
organizations, as they are known nationally, have consistently denounced the lack 
of their involvement in the drafting of laws concerning their rights and well-
being. Worse, they argue that these initiatives have been either insufficient or 
absent in their actual implementation.   
 In the absence of meaningful changes to the quality of life for victimized-
survivors of armed conflict, regional human rights organizations claim that many 
aspects of the current transitional justice program risks becoming mere theater. If 
in a democracy, the state is understood as having the consent of the majority of its 
citizens, for whom is transition performed? Is it for the majority to assure itself of 
its own legitimacy in the face of a deep and protracted conflict with minority 
dissenting communities? Or is it performed in the name of external witnesses, the 
international community and foreign capital, that seek reassurance that the liberal 
rights of both citizens and property are safeguarded in their interest? Teitel (2000), 
in her constructivist approach, argues that justice is self-created through the 
process of transition. Historical context, the balance of power and the politics it 
produces, law and jurisprudence, institutional organization, and other factors 
produce the conditions of possibility for both the emergence of a unique sense of 
justice and its application. If we follow Teitel’s (2000) constructivist approach, 
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must not all of these purposes, as well as others, be a part of the aim of transition? 
For whom is transitional justice? 
 Scholars of transitional justice have increasingly argued for its localization 
(Hinton, 2011; McEvoy & McGregor, 2008; Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). These 
authors suggest that we must move away from the established binaries and 
categories that have organized debates in the field. To juxtapose so-called 
universal human values to local perspectives and needs, elides both the particular 
history of their emergence, and the inequities that inhere in such a division. 
Moreover, it robs us of creative possibilities to reshape and contextualize law and 
practice in particular settings. The local itself cannot be abstracted from larger 
national and international contexts. This is not only because those contexts 
contour and constrain the local through structures and institutions that penetrate it 
such as media, economy, and law but that to abstract the local within human rights 
practice is to marginalize it (Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). The local, rendered 
peripheral to the universal, becomes conceptualized as a reservoir of culture, 
antithetical to modernity, and separated from larger systems of thought and 
governance (Restrepo, 2011). Thus, the local is conceptualized as a place from 
which knowledge, particularly knowledge of human rights, cannot emerge. 
Instead, scholars critical of universalizing approaches argue that the local is 
indeed an important site for the production of knowledge (Chatterji et al., 2016). 
It is not separate from the rest of the world, but rather provides a unique 
perspective on it (Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). The local is not merely the site for the 
	 	 50
implementation of transitional justice, but a potential site for its 
reconceptualization towards the transformation of society. In a conflicted 
democracy such as Colombia, the addressing of inequity, that is, of the uneven 
effects of the armed conflict, is essential for a successful program of transitional 
justice.  
 Evaluation of such success cannot be a question of measuring whether 
abstract and external qualifications are being met, but must emerge from the local 
itself.  A critical understanding of relations of power is crucial to this perspective. 
While we recognize that it is precisely the uneven distribution of power that leads 
to the reduction of transitional justice processes to mere theater, not benefiting 
those most proximate to violence, we must also seek to understand how the local 
itself is uneven. Relations of race, gender, sexuality, class, language, and 
otherwise contour who participates at local level and who from there have an 
entrance to national and international forums. If we refuse to abstract the local 
from the larger world, we must also refuse to render it monolithic either across or 
within local sites. Instead, critical scholarship must prioritize an analysis of power 
in understanding transitional justice processes as they are conceptualized, 
legislated, and implemented unevenly across society. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Restatement of the Purpose of the Study 
 International and national frameworks of transitional justice, understood in 
the contemporary sense, are a relatively recent phenomena which emerged 
following the Second World War and have only begun to take concrete shape in 
the last few decades.   Studies, thus, is a new field still in a process of 
disciplination and formalization. Necessarily emerging as an interdisciplinary 
field, Transitional justice Studies already draws heavily on social sciences 
including sociology and anthropology. In particular, I employ post-colonial 
participatory ethnographic and pedagogical methods in seeking to understand and 
support the work of local researchers and advocates.  Engaging with English and 32
Spanish language scholars, I focus on the experiences of victimized-survivors 
turned researchers and advocates. Examining legal, institutional, and policy 
frameworks, this study attempts to be an act of translation between various 
archival, advocacy, institutional, academic sites that document the grounded work 
of transitional justice. Through this work, I have supported the development of 
research protocols for the evaluation of the implementation of the Peace Accord in 
Medellín and Urabá, participated in workshops organized by state and civil 
 I name my methods post-colonial in the acknowledgement of the long history of social sciences 32
broadly, and anthropology in particular, serving as handmaiden to colonial and neo-colonial interests. 
Taking seriously a critique of power relations is key to questioning this legacy. Participatory research, by 
working in solidarity with local actors, seeks to undermine the traditional binaries of researcher and 
researched, subject and object.
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society organizations, and conducted interviews with victim advocates and civil 
society leaders.  
Research Design 
 This study is ethnographic and participatory in its methodological 
approach. Drawing from a rich and critical history of ethnographic research in 
anthropology, including activist and engaged ethnography, this study can be 
understood as having been undertaken in two phases (Chari & Donner, 2010; 
Hale, 2008; Kirsch, 2018). In the first phase, I conducted participatory 
observations and interviews to understand the history of CEPO. By attending 
several of their meetings I gained an understanding of institutional dynamics, as 
well as methodological and political commitments that helped shape several 
workshops which resulted in the collaborative creation of a research protocol 
designed to evaluate the implementation of the Peace Accord across five 
municipalities of Urabá, Antioquia.  Semi-structured interviews with CEPO 33
members deepened my understanding of how their personal histories led to their 
participation in this work, a sense of their academic and organizing backgrounds, 
and the importance of this research for the development of their organization. My 
participation in CEPO’s study culminated in a preliminary research trip to Urabá 
where we conducted interviews with demobilized FARC soldiers, state officials, 
and community leaders.  These interviews not only deepened my understanding 34
 The meetings were on 3/3/18, 3/7/18, and 3/12/18.33
 The trip was conducted between 3/26/18 and 3/30/18.34
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of the specific history of the conflict in Urabá but also provided the opportunity to 
refine CEPO’s research design and interview protocols. Through CEPO, I also 
gave a lecture on transitional justice in a Human Rights Education course at the 
Universidad de Antioquia and organized a workshop for community leaders in 
Apartadó.  35
 The second phase of the research consisted of in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with victims’ advocates, civil society leaders, and state officials 
concerning their personal histories, participation in transitional justice work, and 
reflection on the Peace Accord and its implementation. In total, I recorded semi-
structured interviews with 20 individuals, and conducted several informal 
interviews of which I took extensive notes. Participant observations also extended 
to the second phase including several workshops and events variously held by 
state institutions and civil society organizations. These included the first 
departmental convocation of Victims’ Representatives in Cauca by the Victims’ 
Unit, a public event organized by victim’s organizations commemorating The 
National Day of Memory in Medellín, an official meeting between the Truth 
Commission and civil society organizations from Antioquia, and Re-tejiendo 
Saberes, a formal discussion and workshop between representatives of state 
institutions tasked with addressing the needs and guaranteeing the rights of 
Victims (The National Police and Armed Forces, Ombudsman’s Office, Attorney 
General’s Office, Solicitor General’s Office) and Victims’ Representatives and the 
 The lecture was given on 3/14/18 and the workshop was held on 3/26/2018.35
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heads of women’s civil society organizations organized by Lawyers Without 
Borders.      
Participants and Data Collection 
  CEPO is a student- and faculty-led community research and teaching 
collective at the Universidad de Antioquia (though not directly affiliated with the 
university), created with the intention of contributing to the strengthening of the 
social fabric of rural and urban communities in Antioquia, Colombia. Their work 
is focused on building and documenting collective and cultural memory in ethnic 
communities, supporting open and inclusive democratic participation, 
consolidating the right to peace, and seeking the social well-being of local 
communities. They have approached this vision through several projects including 
the building of Peace Councils in both Medellín and Apartadó, researching the 
implementation of a national Human Rights Education curriculum, participation 
in electoral organizing supporting candidates and organizations dedicated to 
implementing peace, and developing forums for public dialogues on Peace.  36
 In supporting the work of CEPO, I led a series of workshops which 
resulted in the development of a complete research protocol for future 
implementation.  The research will inquire into the state of the implementation of 37
the peace accord in five municipalities of the Urabá region of Antioquia deemed 
 See Chapter Four for more background on CEPO and their work.36
 The workshops were conducted between 3/20/18 and 3/25/28.37
	 	 55
amongst the ‘most affected’ by the armed conflict, and thus requiring monitoring 
and verification per the Peace Accord: Dabeiba, Remedios, Anorí, Ituango y Vigía 
del Fuerte. This research will include interviews and focus groups with 
community leaders, human rights defenders, local officials, students, teachers, 
healthcare workers, and others and is to be conducted by a network of local 
school teachers trained by CEPO team members. The data collected by CEPO 
will be recorded and transcribed to form part of an archive gathered by the 
Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del 
Acuerdo Final (Colombian Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying 
the Implementation of the Final Agreement, CSIVI) and the Instancia Especial de 
Alto Nivel de los Pueblos Étnicos para el Seguimiento de la Implementación del 
Acuerdo Final (Special High-Level Body with Ethnic Peoples for Monitoring 
Implementation of the Peace Accords), bodies created by the Peace Accord to 
ensure its full and just implementation, the later focused on guaranteeing the 
rights of ethnic communities in this process. CEPO, as part of this process, will 
use the data collected to write individual reports for each of the five 
municipalities and a cumulative report on the state of the implementation of the 
Peace Accord in Antioquia. In continued collaboration with this work, I 
committed to translating and helping to circulate these reports.  
 In supporting the development of this research project, I accompanied 
CEPO team members on a preliminary research trip to Urabá where we conducted 
interviews and site visits in Brisas, Turbo, Apartadó, and a ZVTN near Brisas. 
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Over four days we interviewed the Community Leader of Brisas, a professional 
mediator working with the UN, an envoy of the Colombian Armed Forces to the 
FARC transitional zone, survivors of the La Chinita massacre,  and other 38
community members including the president of the Community Action Board.  
These visits helped to finalize the research and interview protocols we had been 
developing.  
 Phase two of my research was situated in Medellín, where, through 
personal referrals which began with long term relationships and extended through 
my interviewees, I recruited Victims’ Representatives (themselves victimized-
survivors), civil society leaders, and officials working with the Victims’ Unit to 
participate in one- to three-hour semi-structured interviews. These interviews 
focused on their participation in the implementation of the Peace Accord and 
other transitional justice processes, what in their personal histories brought them 
to this work, their sense of how the peace accord was being implemented, and its 
effects on their communities, and their hopes for the future of Colombia.  
 Participants in these interviews were advocates, researchers, and officials 
practiced in discussing these topics. My questions did not inquire directly into 
personal histories of violence, or other human rights violations. Instead, they 
focused on the aftermath of these violations particularly in the post-accord period, 
 Named after the neighborhood in the City of Apartadó where it occurred, La Chinita Massacre, is seen 38
as one of the worst atrocities committed by the FARC. On the evening of January 23, 1994, the FARC 
massacred 35 members and wounded 17 at a community event, seeking revenge for the perceived betrayal 
of former EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación) soldiers who had since demobilized in an agreement with 
the government (Unidad de Victimas, 2019).
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seeking to understand the work and the presence or absence of state institutions in 
providing nationally and internationally guaranteed rights to truth, justice, and 
restitution. I explicitly sought to avoid re-traumatization, centering the discussions 
on the interest of participants in their work, expertise, and opinions on general 
questions of transitional justice. 
Validity and Reliability 
 While questions of validity and reliability are often underemphasized in 
anthropological research, given its more immersive, critical, and dialogical 
approaches, I will briefly address these issues. The question of validity gained 
shape and substance as I began data collection. I want to be clear in stating that 
my research in no way seeks to be objective. Rather, following traditions of 
activist and engaged scholarship, my hope is that this work was meaningful and 
relevant to the participants in reflecting on their work on transitional justice and to 
the members of CEPO in their efforts to monitor and evaluate the implementation 
of the Peace Accord (Hale, 2008). The meaning of this work will extend beyond 
the research period in the form of continued solidarity. In particular, I have 
committed to supporting CEPO in translating their reports and helping to circulate 
them in the United States. Furthermore, the experience of this research informs 
my continued advocacy and organizing. 
 Secondarily, I hope that such meaning and relevance extends to a larger 
world of scholars, advocates, researchers, and policy analysis in their work to 
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critically understand human rights and support communities seeking to implement 
transitional justice frameworks. The question of validity, then, must be asked in 
relation to the much larger and salient questions of relevance and meaning. 
 Reliability, on the other hand, is a more concrete issue in relation to my 
study. Seeking to frame my research and writing as a scholar in alliance with 
victimized-survivors-advocates rebuilding communities and their way of life, 
neither my data collection nor analysis could be conducted in the abstract 
isolation of a properly trained subject. The interviews were semi-structured to 
provide space for the interests and concerns of participants, inquiring into what 
questions they found most relevant. Furthermore, I have been in contact with 
several participants regarding the reliability of my transcriptions and my analysis. 
My extended stay in Colombia facilitated this collaboration, allowing me to begin 
data analysis concurrent to ongoing interviews and providing proximity to 
interviewees to revisit interviews and discuss my findings. 
Analysis 
The analysis of my interviews, observations, and notes were genealogical 
in the sense elaborated by Michel Foucault. In his 1975-1976 Lecture at the 
Collége de France, Foucault (2003) describes genealogy as the union of 
“disqualified” and “local” knowledges (p.8). In genealogy, subjugated 
knowledges provide the content and contours of a history of the present, allowing 
one to question not just the efficacy and effect of a particular discourse or social 
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reality, say, transitional justice, but to trace its emergence. This gives us a sense 
not simply of how it came to be, but rather to examine the conditions that led to 
its emergence (Foucault, 2012). In particular, I am interested in the complex, 
contradictory, and overlapping structures of governance that result in transitional 
justice policy and implementation.  
 My study engaged with human rights advocates and social leaders to elicit 
counter-memory as an intervention in dominant history (Foucault, 2012). More 
importantly though, it evokes counter-memory in that the subjects of my research, 
advocates and researchers, were not treated as transcendental signifiers speaking 
to a universal human experience. Instead, I was interested in understanding how 
they have been produced as subjects, both by the particularities of their individual 
lives and the shared (if unevenly) experience of the armed conflict as well as their 
perspectives on larger questions of transitional justice and their participation in its 
mechanisms. How have their experiences shaped the way they understand 
governance, the role of the Colombian state, and the political possibilities that will 
shape their futures? 
 Further, I was interested in how their own efforts for justice have not only 
contributed to their production as subjects, but have in turn, shaped discourse at 
local, national and international levels in ways that have affected structures of 
governance. What do these questions say about our shared (once again, unevenly) 
present, in the sense of structures of nation-state that have become all but 
	 	 60
ubiquitous, and of transitional justice programs that have been or will be 
implemented? As a “history of the present,” a Derridian attention to “the event,” 
that which is unexpected and ruptures the present, was necessary as I seek to 
place questions of participation in transitional justice in the complexities of the 
present moment in Colombia (Derrida & Kamuf, 2002, p72). 
 Returning to genealogy, what role did subjugated knowledges have in this 
analysis? To which local and disqualified knowledges did I refer? In this study, 
Colombian scholarship, in a certain sense, is considered disqualified knowledge. 
In what sense? In the sense that, global north, typically English language 
scholarship, particularly in legal and sociological studies, seeks to establish an 
objective authority based on its distance from the subject(s) being studied. As 
such, Colombian scholars including those working at CEPO, other civil society 
organizations, and the Victims’ Unit, who no doubt have a direct investment in the 
outcome of the internal armed conflict, transitional justice processes, and 
Colombian governmentality in general, are seen as too implicated, too imbricated, 
and too motivated to produce truly objective knowledge. In fact, the widespread 
disqualification of this scholarship needs not to depend on such a well-
established, if absurd, justification. The inertia of global northern scholarship, that 
is, its tendency to refer to itself as both reference and framework, is enough to 
create a de facto disqualification, disqualification through ignorance (a product of 
privilege) and assumed irrelevance.  
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 Local knowledge is fundamental to my methodology. Participants in this 
study, as researchers, advocates, and victimized-survivors of the armed conflict, 
are producers of local knowledge, experts on their own experience and of the 
communities they work in. Relying on narratives of their experience, that is, on 
counter-memory, my work seeks to destabilize more authoritative, more well 
established, and ultimately more distant and unaccountable narratives that inform 
state discourse and other dominant knowledges. As I addressed briefly above, the 
initial interviews themselves influenced subsequent interviews. Recruitment of 
participants depended on referrals of participants themselves, one interview 
leading to the next. 
Furthermore, the emphasis of my research questions necessarily changed 
through my immersion in the work of my participants and their understanding of 
what were key questions for transitional justice in Colombia.  The destabilization 
of dominant knowledges thus occurs not through my individual scholarly effort 
but through the combined efforts of local communities and regional scholars 
towards the production of meaningful and relevant narratives and understandings. 
Summary of Methods  
Participant Observations 
 Phase one: I attended CEPO team meetings, developed and led CEPO 
research protocol development, lectured in a Human Rights Education course at 
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the Universidad de Antioquia on behalf of CEPO, developed and led a workshop 
in transitional justice for community leaders and advocates in Apartadó on behalf 
of CEPO, supported a CEPO’s pilot study on the implementation of the Peace 
Accord in Urabá. 
 Phase two: I attended the first departmental convocation of Victims’ 
Representatives in Cauca by the Victims’ Unit, attended a public event organized 
by victim’s organizations commemorating The National Day of Memory in 
Medellín, attended an official meeting between the Truth Commission and civil 
society organizations from Antioquia,  attended Re-tejiendo Saberes, a workshop 
between representatives of state institutions tasked with addressing the needs and 
guaranteeing the rights of Victims (The National Police and Armed Forces, 
Ombudsman’s Office, Attorney General’s Office, Solicitor General’s Office) and 
Victim’s Representatives and the heads of women’s civil society organizations 
organized by Lawyers Without Borders. 
Interviews 
 Phase one: I conducted interviews with CEPO team members, 
collaborated in conducting interviews during CEPO’s pilot study in Urabá.  
 Phase two: I interviewed Victims’ Representatives to (municipal, 
departmental, and national) Victims’ Councils, interviewed civil society leaders 
including members of Ruta Pacifica and Redpaz, and interviewed officials 
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working for the Victim’s Unit in Medellín. Table 1, below, lists interviews, 
participant observations, and informal meetings for both phases.  
 Reflexive note-taking: A nightly discipline of reflecting on and 
documenting the day of participant observation, as well as compiling and 
transcribing the day’s notes. 
Table 1  
Table of Methods 
Interviews
Position/ Title Place of Interview Date
     Phase One
Former Mayor of Brisas Brisas, Urabá 3/18
Community President/ Victims’ 
Representative Brisas, Urabá 3/18
Colombian State Mediator working 
for the UN Brisas, Urabá 3/18
President of Transitional 
Normalization Zone (ZVTN) Vereda 
Brisas
ZVTM Vereda Brisas, Urabá 3/18
Victimized-survivor of La Chinita 
Massacre (Grandmother) La Chinita, Apartadó, Urabá 3/18
Victimized-survivor of La Chinita 
Massacre (Grandaughter) La Chinita, Apartadó, Urabá 3/18
President of Community Action 
Board of La Chinita La Chinita, Apartadó, Urabá 3/18
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Coordinator for CEPO Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 3/18
Researcher for CEPO Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 3/18
Researcher for CEPO Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 3/18
Researcher for CEPO Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 3/18
     Phase Two
Antioquia’s Departmental Victims’ 
Mesa - National Victims’ Mesa 
Sexual Violence Committee
Plaza Mayor - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
President of Antioquia’s 
Departmental Victims’ Mesa UniSabaneta- Sabineta, Antioquia 4/18
Researcher for CODHES 
Consultancy on Human Rights and 
Displacement
Teatro Tobon - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Medellín’s Victims’ Mesa - TJ 
committee Museo de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Medellín’s Victims’ Mesa 
Representative - Land Restitution 
Committee
Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Medellín’s Victims  Mesa 
Representative - Women’s 
Committee
Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Victims’ Unit Official - Reparations 
Officer Victims’ Unit Office - Medellín 4/18
Victims’ Unit Official - Transitional 
Justice Officer Victims’ Unit Office - Medellín 4/18
Founder and ED of Ruta Pacifica Ruta Pacifica Office - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Ruta Pacifica: Urabá Representative Ruta Pacifica Office - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
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Cauca’s Departmental Mesa - 
National Victims’ Mesa - 
Transitional Justice Committee
Santander de Quilichao, Cauca 4/18
Participant Observations 
Event Place Date
     Phase One
Workshop: Transitional Justice in 
Local Communities. I presented and 
led a discussion between advocates 
as requested by CEPO and local 
organizers.
Community Center - Apartadó, Urabá 3/18
Inclusion in Early Childhood 
Pedagogy Class: I lectured for two 
hours on transitional justice and 
constructivist pedagogy.
Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 3/18
Three workshops I developed and 
offered on Methodology, Interview 
Protocol, and Consent for CEPO. 
These workshops led to the 
development of the pilot study and 
Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 3/18
Community Meeting on Electoral 
Organizing and Transitional justice - 
Observed and participated in 
discussion
La Chinita -Apartadó, Urabá 3/18
     Phase Two
First Departmental Meeting of 
Victim Leaders of Cauca - 
Organized by Victim’s Unit
Santander de Quilichao, Cauca 2/18
Victim’s Day Event - Roundtable 
discussion. Teatro Tobon - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
First Meeting of Victim’s Leaders 
with the Truth Commission. Plaza Botero Hotel - Medellín Antioquia 4/18
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 Hopefully this chapter helped to situate the reader in my research 
experience, giving a sense of its immersion in a social world. It is from these 
conversations and perspectives which I have structured the following chapters. 
The work of CEPO frames the introduction and substance of Chapter Four, 
Re-tejiendo Saberes: Lawyers 
without Borders (Montreal) Civil 
Society and State Institutions. 
Meeting to discuss attention to 
Victims.
Hotel - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Informal Meetings
Position/ Title Place of Interview
High School Student and Youth 
Organizer Turbo, Urabá 3/18
Professor of Political Science at the 
Universidad de Antioquia Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
National Adviser for REDPAZ: a 
national peace Advocacy 
Organization.
His home in Medellín - Medellín, Antioquia 4/18
Victims’ Leader - Cauca Santander de Quilichao, Cauca 2/18
Victims’ Leader - Cauca Santander de Quilichao, Cauca 2/18
Victims’ Leader - Cauca Santander de Quilichao, Cauca 2/18
Feminist Poet and Activist Poetry festival and her home in Medellín 4/18
Journalist working for 
verdadabierta.com Cali, Valle de Cauca 2/18
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examining the constitutional basis for participation in governance in Colombia, 
and its focus on the work of Municipal Peace Councils. Similarly, it is my long- 
standing relationships with representatives of the mesas that structured my inquiry 
into participation broadly and into the work of the mesas in particular. These 
state- formed structures, which are the foundation of victims’ participation in 
transitional justice and subsequently, the Peace Accord, are the focus of Chapter 
Five. This second findings chapter, where social facts are interwoven with 
ethnographic reflections and the voices of interviewees, provides a structural and 
grounded perspective on participation in transitional justice in Colombia.  
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Chapter Four: The Right Of Participation and The Peace Councils 
 The policy of peace is a policy of the state, permanent and participatory. 
(Law 434, art.1). 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I introduce the constitutional foundation for citizens’ participation 
in Colombian governance. This legal innovation sets the stage for victims’ participation 
in transitional justice discussed in the following chapters. Here, I focus on the work of a 
university-based collective focused on research, advocacy, and organizing for democratic 
participation, particularly in peace processes. Through participatory research, I supported 
the development of a research protocol with this collective, leading to a pilot study that 
helped refine the larger project and gave me some insight into the experiences of 
victimized-survivors in Urabá, and their participation in Municipal Peace Councils.  
Participation in the Constitution of 1991  
 CEPO, El Centro de Estudios Politicos, was formed in 2008 as students in the 
political studies department at the Universidad de Antioquia developed a study group on 
the political history of Colombia focusing on the notion of participatory democracy 
elaborated in the Constitution of 1991. This current constitution of Colombia arose in the 
aftermath of another peace process with the urban youth guerrilla group M-19, which 
forced a recognition of the limits of the Colombian government to meet its 
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responsibilities to its citizens .  A National Constitutional Assembly was formed, in 39
which commissions composed of demobilized guerrilla soldiers, civil society, including 
representatives of ethnic and women’s organizations, alongside elected officials and legal 
scholars, participated in the drafting and eventual ratification of a new Constitution. 
Declaring Colombia a pluralistic nation, and establishing a new state of social right, it 
was and is still seen as one of the world’s most progressive constitutions. 
  In this new legal foundation, citizen participation is understood as 
crucial to address the issues productive of the recurrent national crises of 
legitimacy and governability. At the time of the Constitutional Assembly, this took 
the form of  widespread corruption and clientelism of political classes due to the 
influx of capital from narco-trafficking organizations and international resource 
extraction and production (Rizo, 2011).  Furthermore, participation was thought 40
to undermine a principal claim of legitimacy for guerrilla groups: the exclusion of 
the majority of the population from representative governance, particularly youth, 
labor organizations, as well as Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and campesino 
communities (Rizo, 2011).  
 The national impact of the Palacio de Justicia tragedy, where M-19 members entered the Supreme 39
Court of Colombia in 1985 taking over 350 workers and justices as hostages was particularly relevant. 
The Colombian Armed forces and the National Police responded with a brutal siege that led to the deaths 
of 98 persons and the enforced disappearance of 11 others. This act, later classified a massacre by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, was televised nationally and included images of tanks 
breaking through the main entrance, becoming an international scandal (Gómez Gallego et al. 2010). 
 There is little argument amongst Colombia political and historical scholars that these very conditions 40
persist today. 
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  The reordering of Colombia as a “democratic, pluralist, and 
participatory” state sought to address the crisis of its representative governance by 
recognizing the diverse character of its population, aligning with a global shift 
towards human rights norms, and making participation a “constitutional value, a 
fundamental principal, and a primary goal” of the Colombian State (Mosquera & 
Cuesta, 2015, p. 60). The constitution itself establishes the legal foundation for at 
least thirteen mechanisms for direct citizen participation in governance, 
categorized by scholars as mechanisms related to the right to information, 
mechanisms for “exercising control and correspondent judicial action” and 
mechanisms for decision making (Cogollos & Ramírez, 2007, p.9). These 
mechanisms include the right to tutela , referendum, informed consent, 41
plebiscite, and impeachment (Mosquera & Cuesta, 2015, p. 66). The constitution 
also calls for the creation of a variety of citizen’s councils, creating spaces for a 
wide swath of civil society to participate directly in creating and reviewing policy 
proposals. In the decades that followed the ratification of the new constitution 
over 26 laws and 29 judicial directives have established the legal foundation for 
over 50 mechanisms of citizen participation (Mosquera & Cuesta, 2015).   
 This direct citizen petition to the judiciary for legal remedy is often used by citizens and community 41
groups seeking to hold municipal and departmental governments accountable for the neglect or violations 
of rights. For example, if the local police force refuses to file a citizen’s complaint against a police officer, 
a tutela may be filed, reviewed by a judge, resulting in a judge’s order to accept the original complaint. 
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Law 434 and Participatory Peace 
 In 1998, in accordance with the norms established under the new 
constitution and the peace accord signed with the M-19 guerrillas, Law 434 was 
passed by the Colombian Congress establishing the National Peace Council and 
its affiliated Departmental and Municipal Peace Councils. The role of each of 
these councils is to offer consultation and support to their associated level of 
government in all issues relating to the construction of peace and to coordinate the 
work of various institutions towards this end. These tasks include elaborating and 
proposing strategies addressing issues of peace and human rights, suggesting 
concrete actions to specific institutions, establishing priorities for the construction 
of peace and the identification of places of greatest need, and organizing and 
motivating citizen participation in peace processes including the creation of the 
Peace Councils themselves. The councils thus seek to integrate community 
members in the governance of peace, facilitating a direct connection between 
institutions of state and local organizations. They are composed of civil society 
representatives of women, youth, ethnic, cultural and arts, victims, media, labor, 
business, LGBTI, displaced persons, religious, campesino, academic, 
environmental, demobilized guerrilla and paramilitary soldier’s organizations, as 
well as representatives of government institutions including the chief executive 
(President, Governor, or Mayor), The Attorney General’s office, The 
Ombudsman’s office, Legislators, Police and Armed Forces, Ministers, and 
Representatives of other institutions tasked with implementing peace processes. In 
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theory, these councils provide a space for direct participation of civil society in 
building policies for peace and giving them access to the highest levels of 
government, leading to greater investment by community organizations and 
accountability on the part of the state.  
CEPO’s Role in Supporting Democratic Participation  
 In the years following their founding in 2008, El Centro de Estudios 
Politicos grew from loosely organized study groups of political science students 
to an active collective organizing public dialogues: lectures and discussion groups 
at the university, public libraries, city plazas and parks. These lectures and 
community discussions sought to increase participation of marginalized groups in 
democratic processes through educating the public on the structure of the state, 
the Constitution, and mechanisms for participation, often by bringing this 
information to the communities on the literal and figurative periphery of 
Medellín. “We wanted to bring politics to the margins, to those people who are 
forgotten about in political discourses, and who don’t see themselves as having 
anything to go with government” (CEPO Coordinator, April 18, 2018).     42
 This work led the collective to developing strong relationships with local 
officials in Itagüí, a municipality neighboring Medellín, through which they were 
contracted to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of a national Human 
 All interviewees are anonymous for the purposes of this dissertation due to the ongoing political 42
situation in Colombia.
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Rights Education curriculum in the municipality’s public schools. Through 
interviews and focus groups they found that the majority of educators were 
unaware of the program, and that the few who had tried to implement the 
curriculum felt unsupported and under-resourced. Though disillusioned with their 
findings, this experience recommitted them to and expanded their vision to 
decentralize democratic participation and support peace processes at all levels of 
civil society. 
  CEPO began participating directly in the construction of peace by helping 
to organize Municipal Peace Councils across Antioquia. They reached out to civil 
society organizations, primarily ethnic, youth, and women’s organizations,  
encouraging them to participate in the creation of the councils. They offered 
workshops to educate their representatives about Law 434, the larger peace 
process, and their rights to create these councils as a vehicle for participating 
directly in all issues related to building peace. Since 2012, CEPO has helped to 
form Municipal Peace Councils in Itagüí, Vigia del Fuerte, and Murindo, and are 
currently in the process of establishing a council in Apartadó. Furthermore, under 
the auspices of Law 1622 of 2013 , it has supported the creation of Youth 43
Councils in Apartadó and Itagüí.  
 The Estatuto de Ciudadanía Juvenil (Youth Citizens Statute) seeks to guarantee the rights of youth and 43
creates mechanisms for participation, including the creation of frameworks for National, Departmental 
and Municipal Youth Councils. It is thus understood as part of the larger set of laws ensuring participation 
in Colombia. 
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 They understand this work as central to their mission to help to construct 
territorial peace. The founder and general coordinator of CEPO understands this 
concept as an intervention on the centralization of government that has left access 
to services and sites of power concentrated in the largest cities, principally Bogotá 
and Medellín, ever deepening the divide between rural and urban communities. 
The construction of territorial peace, in this context, concerns addressing inequity, 
“to address the root causes of violence, the violence that people live every day, the 
construction of peace must not be simply about economic development but human 
development, and not simply in the capital, but in all of our territories” (CEPO 
Coordinator, April 18, 2018). Territorios, territories, takes on a particular meaning 
in Colombia given the intensity of the divide between the center and its margins, 
the metropol and the periphery. Inequity, stark across Colombia, is exacerbated by 
the lack of services, resources, security, and access throughout rural areas of 
Colombia. In fact, the ungovernability of Colombia is often ascribed to its diverse 
and difficult geography by more deterministic political scientists. Others, 
including the political scientists of CEPO, argue that the lack of meaningful social 
services is more of a reflection of the concentration of wealth and political power 
by urban elites and large rural landlords, and a willingness to use military force to 
suppress civil society efforts addressing inequities, than a fact of topography.  
 The question of peace for whom and by whom animates the work of 
CEPO, as they seek to facilitate democratic participation through the creation of 
Municipal Peace Councils. By connecting grassroots organizers from youth, 
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women’s, ethnic, campesino, and arts organizations to local governance, CEPO 
seeks to diffuse the tendency towards centralization in governance including in 
peace processes. Participating on the councils helps community leaders to build 
direct relationships with elected officials and institutional officers. Beyond the 
stated work of the councils, to propose strategies for peace and review ongoing 
processes, these relationships become crucial to issues in the day-to-day life of 
communities. Calls for state intervention in moments where armed actors threaten 
communities, for example, are taken more seriously and responded to quicker 
when a personal relationship with the mayor or other officials can be called upon. 
Participation in the councils also builds leadership and strengthens relationships 
across civil society. Furthermore, the councils also provide local documentation of 
the armed conflict and its effects, expanding our understanding of violence in 
Colombia and helping to make clear the connections between the everyday 
structural injustices of racism, sexism, and poverty and the long-lasting effects of 
armed violence and human rights violations. 
Financial and Political Limits of Participation in Peace Councils 
 According to Fundación Ideas Para la Paz (FiP), The National Peace 
Council now has 98 members.  62 of these members are a wide range of 44
representatives of civil society. The other 36 members are from the highest level 
 In 2015 there was an update to Law 134 of 1994 (The Mechanisms for Citizen Participation Law) in 44
Law 1757 of 2015 (The Promotion and Protection of The Right to Citizen Participation Law) which 
expanded citizen participation by extending the number of participants on various councils, provided 
special funds for some mechanisms, and lowered the threshold for the establishment of others. 
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of government including legislators, ministers, governors, the mayors of the 
largest cities, and the president. Since its founding in 1998, it has met more or less 
regularly to address issues related to peace across the country, formulating 
proposals and seeking to coordinate actions across government entities (FiP, 
2016).  
 In comparison, of the 32 departments in Colombia only 18 Departmental 
Peace Councils have been created. 13 of those councils were created in 1998, 4 in 
2001, and 1 in 2004. Of those, only 6 are currently active. Of the 1,102 
municipalities in the country, 177 have created Municipal Peace Councils of 
which 41 are active (FiP, 2016). In their survey of Municipal Peace Councils FiP 
found that a lack of interest (by civil society members and/or state institutions) led 
to the inability to meet a quorum to create the council (FiP, 2016). In other cases, 
there was simply an absence of municipal or departmental support. Lastly, they 
found that in many municipalities other instances of participation, such as 
Victims’ Mesas served similar functions as would a Municipal Peace Council and 
were thus deemed redundant by local governments. Indeed, the legal scholars of 
participation have argued that one of the principal obstacles to widespread citizen 
participation is the complex and overlapping terrain of mechanisms that produce 
ambiguous relationships between councils and procedures (Collogos & Ramirez, 
2007; Mosquera & Cuesta 2016). This complexity leads to a sense that such 
councils are superfluous. 
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 In interviews with CEPO members, the lack of consistent municipal 
support was understood as the greatest barrier to the creation and continued 
effectiveness of a municipal peace council. In an apparent paradox, the poorest 
municipalities in which CEPO organized peace councils, Murindo and Vigia del 
Fuerte, saw the Peace Councils fully funded and supported by the local 
government with regular participation by its institutions including their mayors. 
Both municipalities are near the border of Antioquia and Chocó along the Rio 
Atrato, have majority Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, and have 
suffered long standing periods of armed conflict between guerrilla, para-military, 
and the Armed Forces of Colombia.  
 During our pilot study, CEPO’s coordinator and I interviewed a former 
mayor of Murindó who was also an active member of the Municipal Peace 
Council. He, coordinating with local teachers and the current mayor, was 
traveling to Medellín to petition the government in supporting the Peace Council 
in the creation of two new school houses. “The old school building was already 
deteriorating, full of mold and pests, it was a dangerous place to send our 
children, and that was before the river took them in a flood”. He continued, 
How are we supposed to participate in the peace process when we don’t 
even have a place for our children to learn to read and write? It is true that 
sometimes our representatives to the councils and other mechanisms lack 
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the basic education needed to participate and defend our interests. (Mayor, 
March 26, 2018) 
I have heard this argument from others, that the inequities that organize 
access to education across Colombia, have a profound effect on political 
participation, as local leaders struggle with the requirements of their positions, 
including reading and interpreting law, leading educational campaigns, drafting 
public policy, and creating community archives. Representatives argue for more 
equitable access to education for all of their communities as a key step towards 
building sustainable peace processes and in particular ask for access to more 
specialized education in law and public policy for representatives to meet the 
demands of their positions.  
 On the other hand, in Itagüí, a municipality neighboring and directly 
connected through light rail public transit to Medellín, CEPO was forced to put 
forward its own resources to help build the Municipal Peace Council. It is telling 
that the poorest of municipalities often find the resources to support peace 
processes, while larger and wealthier cities fail to support community efforts. 
It is that in the small communities, everyone depends on each other, even 
the mayor needs everyone’s support. Not to mention that there are already so few 
resources that everyone hopes that by participating they will bring more resources 
for basic services.  45
 Interview with CEPO researcher.45
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 In Apartadó, a small city which serves as a principal commercial and 
political center for the Urabá region, the process of establishing a Peace Council 
is ongoing. While CEPO has also invested their own resources and time in 
building the council, a shift in party rule at the municipal level has led to a lack of 
support and at times active resistance to the creation of the council. The question 
of political favor for particular mechanisms of participation is ever present. Given 
that such councils are a meeting place between civil society and government 
officials, they are often at the mercy of political parties. Political participation in 
Colombia is popular, though often highly influenced by vote buying and political 
favor. Local party representatives promise to turn out a given number of voters 
and are in turn dispersed party funds with which to buy those votes, along with 
the promise of support for local organizations. In Apartadó, civil society 
organizations have formed an independent peace mesa which continues to petition 
the local government for the creation of the council. The issue of voter 
manipulation and vote buying is a crucial, yet largely unexamined one in 
addressing the peace process in Colombia. Transitional justice depends on fair and 
consistent implementation by national and local governments through political 
transitions. Sadly, peace processes have most strongly been championed by the 
traditional Liberal party, resulting in a reactive stance against them by right wing 
parties, most prominently Uribe’s Centro Democratico. The issues of funding and 
state support are key to questions of citizens’ participation in democracy broadly 
and the peace process in particular. 
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Para-politics 
  The phenomena of politicians, at all levels of government, 
implicated in either direct support of armed groups, particularly para-military 
forces, or in the political and business interests that underlie the ongoing violence 
has become a national scandal in Colombia. The para-política scandal, as it is 
known, came to be a national scandal in 2006 when a computer owned by a 
paramilitary commander revealed pacts signed by politicians with paramilitary 
groups to support their campaigns through voter suppression and political 
violence in return for political favors and legal immunity (Verdad Abierta, 2010).  
Indeed, Colombian scholars and journalists have documented hundreds of laws 
passed by implicated politicians that directly support paramilitary interests 
(Muñoz Gallego, 2019). The eruption of the scandal, fed by the testimonies of 
paramilitary commanders and soldiers, many of whom were extradited to the 
United States on drug charges once they began revealing their ties to political and 
business elites, has led to dozens of investigations, many of which have lasted 
over a decade. As early as 2013, over 50 representatives to the Colombian 
congress had been condemned for their complicity with paramilitary forces 
(Verdad Abierta, 2013). In 2019, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced that 
it would seek charges against 5,000 persons, including judges, politicians, and 
private business leaders under their ongoing para-politics scandal (Alsema, 2019). 
This figure represents a major reduction in possible cases given that the previous 
“Prosecutor General, Eduardo Montealegre said in 2015 that he had identified 
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22,130 non-combatant state officials who allegedly sponsored the AUC or 
indirectly took part in war crimes.” (Alsema, 2019, para. 2).    46
 This corruption, endemic to the politics of the Colombian right, suggests a 
serious conflict of interest regarding their legally mandated support for human 
rights process and transitional justice mechanisms. In particular, providing 
platforms for participation, which elevate the voices of community members 
seeking to address human rights violations, including efforts for justice and 
accountability, reparation of damages caused by armed actors including the 
restitution of appropriated lands, and the full implementation of the Peace 
Accords which call for agrarian reform addressing issues of inequality across 
rural regions, is in direct contradiction to the interests of paramilitary forces and 
their allied political and business partners.   
CEPO’s Pilot Study: La Urabá Antioqueña    
 Urabá is known for its extensive banana plantations and has been revealed 
as an admonitory example of corporate and paramilitary collaboration leading to 
extensive violations of human rights including targeted assassinations of labor 
organizers, environmentalist, and community leaders and the mass displacement 
 Since then, these cases have been stalled. This is primarily due to new appointments to the Prosecutor 46
General’s office and accusations agains these very figures. 
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of communities and appropriation of lands.  There should be little surprise that 47
the political and business interests leading to this generalized state of violence 
might produce contexts in which municipal governments would be adverse or 
uninterested in supporting peace processes and the promotion of civil society 
participation. This is particularly true in the context of programs of reparation 
which would include the return of stolen lands that have been incorporated into 
the banana plantation system, and truth processes that may seek to hold third 
parties, that is those who provided material and logistical support to armed groups 
in human rights violations, accountable.  
 With CEPO, we interviewed community members in Apartadó, including 
survivors of La Chinita Massacre who spoke to a generalized sense among 
community members that the government at all levels was unaccountable to their 
rights and concerns. “They are all just interested in what helps them. They come 
by and make promises, ask for our vote, maybe leave a few pesos, but they never 
come back, and things never change or get better” (Grandmother, March 28, 
 The notorious Chiquita scandal is but one prominent example of the nexus between capital interests and 47
paramilitary violence. The United Fruit Company, directly implicated in the CIA overthrow of the 
democratically elected government of the president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, in 1954, leading to the 
genocide of Mayan communities, later changed its name to Chiquita Banana. Chiquita had significant 
interests in Urabá, Colombia’s chief banana growing region since the 1990s, coinciding with the 
explosion of armed violence in the region. Through this period, the AUC, grew in strength and size in 
Urabá, leading to the systematic murder of union workers and community leaders along with the mass 
displacement of tens of thousands of persons, and the illegal acquisition of land then subcontracted to the 
banana industry. In subsequent legal investigations by Colombian prosecutors, Chiquita admitted to 
making over 1.7 million dollars of payments to the AUC for “security” between 1997 and 2004, the 
height of AUC violence in the region (Torres & Vidal 2011). In 2018, Colombian prosecutors filed 
charges against 13 employees of Chiquita banana for their support of the paramilitary death squads 
(Semana 2018). Subsidiaries contracting with Chiquita continue to operate in the region and are accused 
of having ties with the current paramilitary forces, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), 
which continue murdering leaders and displacing communities. 
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2018). They felt that both the national and local government was simply too 
removed from their lives and concerns. “They don’t really know what happens 
here, worse, they don’t care” (Grandmother, March 28, 2018).  
 What little support found its way into their communities was dispersed 
through individual indemnities, small lump sums that sought to acknowledge and 
minimally compensate victims of human rights violations for damages incurred 
(Victims Unit, 2019). Registration as a victim, a prerequisite to individual 
reparation, was often thought to make one vulnerable to targeting by armed 
groups through a generalized notion that victims were allied with guerrilla groups, 
or were a threat to armed organizations of any affiliation by seeking justice, 
accountability, and a direct repatriation of land or other resources from the groups 
themselves. “Registration, signals you, it makes you vulnerable” (Granddaughter 
March 28, 2018). Just as troubling, interviewees reported a widespread sense that 
corruption plagued the reparations process. “Those that come here are 
transmitidores, they ask for money promising that they will get you registered and 
that you will get your reparation. It never works that way” (Grandmother, March 
28, 2018).  Some asserted that despite having attempted to register as a victim 48
several times their applications were not accepted or processed. Indeed, they 
claimed that access to individual reparations was tied to one’s political party 
affiliation or personal relationship with local officials.  
 May be translated to transmitter or intermediary.  48
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 CEPO, having long been involved in electoral politics,  both as a way to 49
support candidates and parties in line with their political vision and often as a 
source of revenue, decided, in long conversations following our pilot study, to run 
their own candidate for the mayor of Apartadó. They blamed the stalling of the 
establishment of the Municipal Peace Council directly on the then recently elected 
mayor. They also interpreted the widespread mistrust of community members of 
the peace process generally as a reflection of the corruption of the local 
government, comparing the opinions and experiences of residents of Apartadó 
with those of Murindo and Vigia del Fuerte. Seeking to balance empirical  50
research and electoral organizing, CEPO team members understand, is a delicate 
balance. Yet, they argued, given the lack of state support through direct funding of 
smaller scale efforts such as theirs, they are left with little option than to seek 
funds through electoral organizing for political parties aligned with their vision. 
They, like many Colombians, believe that the political system is indeed rife with 
corruption, but seek through their aspirations to participate directly in local 
governance to bring transparency and accountability to state power at a crucial 
time in the peace process. “It is what we have left, not only supporting 
government, but becoming government” (CEPO Coordinator, April 18, 2018). 
 The postponement of CEPO’s complete investigation on the state of the implementation of the peace 49
accord was a result of the loss of a Green Party candidate to the Colombian Senate. Having organized for 
this candidate for months, they were refused a complete payment for their work following the loss. The 
candidate’s campaign argued that given their loss they neither had the funds nor the obligation to pay 
CEPO. The lack of funds resulted in the inability to move forward with a complete investigation as 
planned for the time being.
 See Methodology for an explanation of CEPO’s understanding of “the empirical”.50
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 This chapter has highlighted many of the structural and bureaucratic limits to 
effective participation as mandated under Colombian law. In closing, I summarize some 
of these findings. Regarding logistical and financial obstacles, lack of the required 
political support for the creation and maintenance of Peace councils and the dependency 
of the creation of Municipal Peace Councils on the authorization of local mayors, in 
particular locations, stifles the efforts of civil society. The lack of municipal support in 
the form of physical and financial resources at times limits the ability of civil society to 
form Municipal Peace Councils as well as limits the ability of individual members to 
participate. Supports include the availability of a secure site to hold meetings and access 
to basic technology including computers and cellular phones. Once established, 
representatives of Peace Councils complain about the personal cost of participation, 
noting the lack of any subsidy for transportation or time, leading to a financial burden and 
lost wages, for already marginalized communities. Furthermore, confusion as to the 
diversity of possible mechanisms for participation left some community members unsure 
of how to address a particular issue, or where to start to get involved with local 
government. Scholars have documented how overlapping laws and institutions lead to 
bureaucratic confusion as well, complexifying communication and coordination with 
community groups.  
 Participation in peace processes in general and Peace Councils in 
particular has political consequences. The consequences can be particularly grave 
given the violence and corruption that surrounds Colombian politics. Interviewees 
stated that participation, or even simply registering as a victim of the armed 
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conflict, a prerequisite for reparations and some forms of participation, marks you 
as a potential guerrilla sympathizer, leading to targeting my official and 
paramilitary forces. There were widespread concerns about corruption by political 
parties and individuals taking advantage of victimized-survivors. The corruption 
of political parties is understood as systematic and de facto. Many assume that 
politicians and their parties are power-hungry and use transitional justice as a way 
of advancing their careers over addressing past and actual violence. There is also 
a generalized suspicion by some victimized-survivors that some victims’ 
organizations, or at least some individuals within them, stand to gain personally 
from their work. 
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Chapter Five: Mesas De Participación Efectiva 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I introduced the constitutional basis of citizen 
participation in Colombia, noting its historical context including its emergence 
from peace processes, civil society’s role in its drafting, and the central and 
diffused role that participation has in the document. From there, I introduced the 
work of CEPO, and in particular, their support for the establishment of Peace 
Councils, an early but important mechanism for citizens’, including victims’, 
participation in the construction of peace. Lastly, in conversation with 
interviewees, I offered an understanding of the limits of participation in local 
governance and in particular in transitional justice mechanisms. These limits are 
grounded in the experiences of local leaders and community members in the 
Urabá region of Antioquia. In particular, they reflect the frustrations and 
suspicions of victimized-survivors of the armed conflict. These feelings often 
arise from personal experience with local, regional, or national institutions and 
they describe a pattern of hope and disappointment in relation to legal and policy 
advances that fail to produce significant improvements to daily life. I ended that 
chapter with a summary of findings, a descriptive list of the limits of participation 
as described by my interviewees. 
 In this chapter, I describe the experiences of persons intimately involved 
with transitional justice: victimized-survivors of the armed conflict who have 
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become deeply involved in organizing and advocacy, leading to their participation 
in a more recent, but now central, mechanism of participation, Las Mesas de 
Victimas. I begin with my notes from a participant observation of an important 
event, the first department-wide meeting of representatives of the mesas in Cauca, 
Colombia, one of the departments hardest hit by the armed conflict. Through this 
short narrative, I provide an example of what participation itself feels like, from 
the perspective of many of the leaders I spoke with. From this vignette, I return to 
law, giving a detailed description of Law 1448 (Victims’ Law), a key statute in the 
legal definition of a Victim, and a foundation to current structures of transitional 
justice. Indeed, much of the current Peace Accord relies and builds upon 
structures of participation established under Law 1448. I then turn to an extended 
description of an interview with a representative to the national mesa, a leader 
with extensive and varied experience organizing, advocating for, and now 
representing victims with a national and international platform. This description 
takes time to describe the context of her life before, during, and after a life 
altering episode of violence. My interviewee insisted that I understand this larger 
context, precisely to be able to glimpse the loss she experienced, and to 
understand how it continues to shape her life and work, including the challenges 
she faces as a representative to the national mesa.  
 Lastly, I take time to review some limits and difficulties to participation in 
transitional justice as described by the various representatives I interviewed. In 
this summary of findings, I refer back to the participant observations and 
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interviews present in this chapter, highlighting the critique of effective and 
meaningful participation that they offer.  I end with an examination of the gravest 
hinderance to victims’ participation in Colombia - the mass and systematic 
murder of human rights defenders and community leaders. This chapter and the 
last serve the purpose of answering my first two sets of research questions 
regarding an examination of laws and institutional structures for participation and 
the experiences of representatives and community members in the implementation 
of these mechanisms.  
The First Departmental Meeting of Victims’ Representatives of Cauca 
 We awoke to the familiar sounds of the Colombian countryside: roosters 
crowing, a myriad of insects buzzing, a stereo blasting cumbia in the distance. I 
had arrived the night before and was immediately offered dinner, joined by people 
eager to eat and talk as we looked out on the verdant moonlit valley. The 
conversation turned on shared and divergent experiences of the armed conflict, 
the ways in which it has intimately affected their lives, weaving a grounded 
understanding of how national and local politics contributed to their life history 
in complex and problematic ways (or sometimes not at all). My bunkmates were 
social leaders and human rights defenders, delegates to their local mesas de 
victimas, almost exclusively from rural communities across Cauca. They were 
gathered here in a finca outside of Santander de Quilichao for the “First 
Departmental Meeting of Victim’s Representatives of Cauca.” Some, from the 
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more remote communities on the Pacific Coast or the small mountain villages of 
the Western Andean Cordillera, had traveled for days by foot, boat, and bus to tell 
their stories of the armed conflict and to represent the needs and concerns of their 
communities. 
 Regional breakout groups of the approximately fifty participants, 
organized the morning’s discussions with volunteers writing down the issues they 
had come to discuss: the needs of demobilized FARC soldiers, the lack of health 
clinics and schools, cocaine production and the need for state supported crop 
substitution, disappeared persons and the search for their remains, mass 
displacement from armed groups fueled by mining and narco-traffic, the ongoing 
threats to and murders of leaders just like themselves. The discussions were 
heated as participants argued for the needs most relevant to their community, 
even as they tried to find common ground to propose meaningful interventions. 
The stakes felt high as this was, for many, the first time they were meeting with 
national level government officials. In the wake of the signing of the Peace 
Accord, they had led campaigns in their communities, educating others on the 
commitments of the government to ensure a just transition away from the armed 
conflict. As they fought to spread hope, they also took on the weight of their 
responsibility to represent others and to help bring tangible positive change.  
 Just as the morning discussion groups were closing and the participants 
were beginning to establish a methodology to determine which issues would be 
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prioritized in their report to the government, national representatives of the 
Victims’ Unit arrived. They brought lunch with them, insisting that everyone break 
as a special surprise was on its way. A couple of hours later, Frank Pearl, an 
economist and politician who was a principal negotiator of the Peace Accord, 
arrived. He spoke at length to the historical context and significance of the 
signing of the accords, the promise of peace, the commitment of the government to 
address the root causes of the conflict, and the crucial role that victims would 
play in the process. The representatives listened politely, but jumped at the 
opportunity to ask questions: “Why are you talking about the end of the conflict 
when people in my community are still being threatened and killed?” “What 
about the cases of harassment and rape of women committed by the armed 
forces?” “Why is my community having to feed and shelter demobilized FARC 
soldiers, where is the state support?” Frank Pearl listened carefully and 
responded candidly acknowledging the questions and claims of representatives 
and stating that there is so much to do and that he was personally committed to 
seeing the accords meaningfully implemented.  
 The staff of the Victims’ Unit anxiously stepped in to dismiss Mr. Pearl and 
set the agenda for the rest of the meeting. Their roles, the staff announced to the 
representatives, would be crucial in the months to come. Their leadership would 
come to constitute the foundation of state interventions to ensure a peaceful end to 
the armed conflict. The success of the peace process rested on their shoulders. 
Therefore, the rest of the meeting would be leadership training. 
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 Realizing that their agenda had just been hijacked, many of the 
representatives left. The ones that stayed, listened to a series of powerpoint 
presentations and participated in small group discussions on what qualities 
constitute a great leader. They were asked to think of a leader they admired and 
write down words that described them. Lastly, everyone was to lay down on 
butcher paper and have their outline drawn to then write in adjectives describing 
leadership qualities. One by one everyone presented their chalk outline, stories of 
the leaders they admired were interrupted in the name of everyone having a 
chance to present. Their moving narratives of personal inspiration, symbols of 
resistance, and concrete practices for organizing and advocacy were reduced to a 
string of adjectives. Photos of participants were taken for the Victims’ Unit’s 
website. The event ended without documentation of the concerns representatives 
had come to share. The symbolism was dense in the air, particularly in regards to 
the chalk outlines, though perhaps not in the way that the Victims’ Unit organizers 
had intended. 
 The leaders I spoke with as the event wrapped up all expressed a similar 
sentiment, “this is how all of our meetings go. They only get us together to take 
our picture, all they want is to show that we were here and that something is 
happening.” (Excerpt from Field Notes, 2/21/18)  
 Addressing my second research question regarding the experiences of 
participants in transitional justice mechanisms, this vignette points to several key 
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issues that I return to later in this chapter: top-down decision making regarding 
the agenda of meetings, the inability of representatives to participate directly in 
the implementation of policy on issues affecting their communities, and their 
sense that many mechanisms for participation are geared towards generating 
positive media over actually addressing concrete issues. The symbolism of the 
chalk outline for victimized-survivors and social leaders, if not already, will 
become clear in Chapter Six. 
Victims’ Law 1448 
 The confluence of legal efforts to expand democratic participation as 
impelled by the Constitution of 1991 and social movements’ efforts towards the 
development and implementation of peace processes in Colombia produced a new 
standard for transitional justice in Colombia under 2011’s Victims and Restitution 
of Lands Law 1448.  This measure is still seen as a rare example of an attempt to 51
implement transitional justice, guaranteeing rights to victims of human rights 
violations, during an ongoing armed conflict. Furthermore, by formally including 
all victims of the armed conflict and making the creation of participatory 
mechanisms mandatory, Law 1448, both built upon and expanded the right to 
 This, of course, is in no way a complete description of the development of participatory mechanisms 51
for peace or for victims’ involvement. In particular, Law 387 of 1997 on the rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, created a framework for participation upon which Laws 1448 was built and expanded upon. 
Furthermore, the so-called Justice and Peace Law, itself a transitional justice framework for paramilitary 
demobilization, included several participatory provisions for victims. These provisions were largely 
related to victim’s participation in truth tribunals, and processes for the creation of historical memory and 
symbolic reparation. 
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participation and peace enshrined in the Constitution and developed through the 
two decades of jurisprudence (de Waardtm & Weber, 2019). 
 Within Colombia, the law is broad in its scope and was crucial in several 
key acknowledgments. Article 1 of the Law states that its objective is to: 
 …establish a conjunct of judicial, administrative, social, economic, 
individual and collective measures to benefit victims… in a transitional 
justice framework that makes possible the enjoyment of their rights to 
truth, justice, and reparation with the guarantee of non-repetition,  in a 52
way which recognizes and dignifies their condition as victims through the 
materialization of their constitutional rights. (Ley 1448, art. 1) 
 It recognized an on-going armed conflict, something the previous president, 
Álvaro Uribe had refused to do,  referring instead to internal criminal and 53
terrorist actions that demanded a militarized police response. Under this state of 
affairs, a negotiated end to the conflict was impossible as there was no 
understanding of the rights or bargaining capacity of other armed actors. In 
 The addition of the right to non-repetition is particularly notable, addressing critiques of previous 52
transitional justice processes that have been mired by ongoing violence. Sadly, this novel legal standard 
has yet to be implemented in a meaningful way.
 In 2007 the Colombian Senate passed Law 157, which was vetoed by then President Uribe. This “Ley 53
de Victimas” was objected to by the executive in part because he believed that reparation was unfeasible 
but also because it acknowledged the internal armed conflict (Acuña, 2012).
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acknowledging the armed conflict, Law 1448 invoked the rights to International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL),  and the state’s responsibilities under it.  54
 Secondly, it recognized the existence of victims of the armed conflict. This 
produced the legal category of Victim, assuring individual and collective rights to 
protection, reparation, truth, and justice as well as effective participation (Ley 
1448). It also recognized that one could be a victim of either state, guerrilla or 
paramilitary violence. Until then, the state, as well as other armed groups, 
regularly denied the existence of victims of their actions, referring instead to 
victims of individual criminal actions or simply, the collateral damages of war. 
This generalized a state of suspicion by armed actors of those who claimed status 
as victim, raising the specter of their collaboration with other groups.   
 The law defines a Victim as a person or collective that has suffered a 
violation of International Humanitarian or Human Rights Law on or since 1985 
(Ley 1448, art. 3). Intimate partners and first degree family members of persons 
who have been subject to extrajudicial execution or enforced disappearance are 
also included (Ley 1448, art. 3). To be eligible for land restitution, the violation 
resulting in territorial dispossession must have occurred on or after 1991 (Ley 
1448, art. 3). Members of guerrilla or paramilitary groups are ineligible to register 
as victims unless they were minors at the time of their demobilization (Ley 1448, 
 International Humanitarian Law, based in the Geneva Protocols, emerged following the devastation of 54
global war in the mid-20th century. It sets international standards for the protection of non-combatant 
civilians as well as establishes limits to the waging of war and other conflicts. The Colombian 
government’s acknowledgment of an internal armed conflict is key to human rights advocate’s invocation 
of IHL in asserting the need for protection and reparation. For an introduction to IHL see: www.icrc.org. 
	 	 96
art. 3, para. 2). Under the law, all victims must first register with the “Special 
Administrative Unit for the Assistance and Integral Reparation of Victims,” an 
entity established under Law 1448. Registration entails presenting a formal 
declaration of the violation and supporting evidence to the unit (Ley 1448, art. 
154-156). This process explicitly overturns the precedent that a perpetrator be 
identified and convicted before a victim may be registered and for rights be 
granted to that victim.  Once registered, all victims are entitled to a range of 55
social services including education, mental and physical healthcare, preferential 
rights to government employment, job training, and housing subsidies, and rights 
to legal counsel to seek damages (Summers, 2012, p. 227).  
Mesas for Victims' Participation 
The accessible and effective participation of the victims, as designated by 
this law, in the design, implementation, execution, and evaluation of governance 
is guaranteed at the national, departmental, municipal, and district level. (Ley 
1448, art. 193)  56
 In addition to legally defining the status of a Victim, Law 1448 established 
the Victims’ Unit, an institution tasked with coordinating all assistance and 
A precedent established by the “Peace and Justice Law” (Law 975 of 2005). This law ostensibly 55
demobilized members of the nation’s largest paramilitary umbrella group the AUC. Advocates and 
scholars contend that this demobilization was at best incomplete, instead resulting in the fracturing of 
paramilitary factions while maintaining relations to the political and business interests that financed and 
supported their violent work. 
 My translation. Original text: “Se garantizará la participación oportuna y efectiva de las víctimas de las 56
que trata la presente ley, en los espacios de diseño, implementación, ejecución y evaluación de la política 
a nivel nacional, departamental, municipal y distrital.”
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reparations measures guaranteed by the state and creating mechanisms for 
“effective participation” of victims in these processes (Victims’ Unit, 2019). 
Towards this effort and under the direction of Law 1448, the Victims Unit 
supports the creation and coordination of the Mesas de Participación Efectiva de 
Víctimas.  The law defines the creation of mesas at the national, departmental 57
and municipal level. Coordinating with the Victims Unit, the national and 
departmental Ombudsman Offices (Defensoria) and the municipal Solicitor’s 
Offices (Personería) are tasked with supporting the establishment of these mesas 
and functioning as their Technical Secretaries (Berrío, 2014). They maintain a 
registry of state recognized Associations of Victims,  from which candidates may 58
be endorsed for locally regulated elections to the mesas. Representatives to the 
mesas must also be registered in the National Victim’s Registry. Thus, all 
participants in the mesas, are both victims of the armed conflict, and leaders in 
their local communities and victim’s organizations. 
 The mesas have 24 to 26 seats, a requirement of the law meant to provide 
a wide diversity of representatives. Many of the seats are reserved based on 
hechos vicitzantes and sectores victamizados (de Waardtm & Weber, 2019).  59
 Effective Participation Councils of Victims57
 These associations are civil society organizations of victims, many established before the passing of 58
Law 1448, that educate and organize victims of the armed conflict and of human right’s violations on 
their legal rights and to advocate for their interests.
 Hechos vicitzantes (victimizing acts): victimized survivors of particular human rights abuses such as 59
gendered and sexualized violence, forcible displacement, the enforced disappearance of a family member. 
Sectores victamizados (victimized sectors of society), that is vulnerable populations, based on ability, age, 
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation. 
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Representatives elected to the mesas serve for two years, up to two terms. 
Following their term, popular representatives often move on to serve at the 
departmental and national level mesas.  
 Each at its own level; municipal, departmental and national, the mesas 
share common purpose and function. They are first and foremost a space for 
representatives of victims’ associations to discuss and propose programs for the 
education, accompaniment, and reparation of victims. Ideally, the mesas serve as 
a mechanism for the everyday and exceptional concerns of victims, rural or urban, 
to be integrated into social and political discourse. It has served as a mechanism 
by which the failures of state institutions have been documented and publicized, 
communities and agencies have been made aware of the emergence and expansion 
of armed groups and human rights violations and where the daily struggles of 
poverty, racial and gendered targeting, and lack of infrastructure have been 
understood as both reason for and exacerbated by the armed conflict. The 
documentation of progress, or lack thereof, in the implementation of processes of 
reparation, is a legally mandated function of the mesas, and has resulted in the 
creation of a large archive of documents and reports describing the ongoing state 
of affairs in the construction of peace across the country. The mesas have been 
most successful in producing educational campaigns raising awareness of 
transitional justice broadly, and the peace accords specifically, demystifying, to a 
degree, the complexities of government institutions, and disseminating 
information about victims’ rights. 
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 Each mesa, according to the law, must also produce an annual Work Plan, 
detailing its meetings, the focus of their work for each period, the activities they 
plan on conducting, and a detailed schedule for their development. Lastly, the law 
stipulates that each mesa, through its existence, serves as a site for the “effective 
participation” of victims, creating a space for victims of various backgrounds, 
experiences, and locations to come together, share, and organize. The question of 
how effective such participation is, of what it is effective, and of how that 
effectiveness is to be evaluated is not addressed in the law. The mesas are, in fact, 
explicitly not decision-making spaces. They have no power over state agencies or 
programs, and exist simply to provide a space for discussion, documentation, and 
the development of proposals.  
 The mesas though, do have the right and obligation to elect representatives 
to specific bodies that are endowed with a degree of decision-making power over 
transitional justice policy and its implementation. The national Mesa elects 
representatives from its members to serve on The Directive Counsel for the 
Special Administrative Unit for Stolen Lands, The Executive Committee for 
Attention and Reparation, The Commission for Accompaniment and Monitoring, 
and the Directive Counsel for the Center of Historic Memory.  Each of these 60
bodies brings together politicians and officials across government institutions to 
design and implement transitional justice processes. At the departmental and 
 Consejo Directivo de la Unidad Administrativa Especial de Restitución de Tierras Despojadas, the 60
Comite Ejecutivo de Atención y Reparación, the Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo, and the Consejo 
Directivo del Centro de Memoria Histórica
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municipal level these, and other related functions, are coordinated through the 
Comités Territoriales de Justicia Transicional (TJCs).  Legally, these committees 61
are understood as having the “maximum responsibility for the coordination, 
application and design of public policy in the department, municipality or district, 
presided over by the governor or mayor respective to victim’s rights” (Victims 
Unit, 2012, p.7). They are charged with developing a Plan of Action under each 
government’s annual Development Plan for the implementation of transitional 
justice, particularly all issues related to guaranteeing “attention, assistance y and 
integral reparation to victims” (Victims Unit, 2012, p. 7).  
 Like the Peace Councils created by Law 434, the transitional justice 
Territorial Committees bring together a wide representation of government 
officials and politicians.  As such, they represent a key nexus for victims’ 62
representatives, the perspectives and concerns compiled through the mesas, and 
the various institutions of government tasked with ensuring access to transitional 
justice for victims of the armed conflict. These Transitional Justice Committees, 
in effect, are the executors of transitional justice programs, being one of the few 
institutional bodies empowered with a budget, and the capacity to coordinate 
government actions.  
 Transitional Justice Territorial Committees61
 Participation by the governor or mayor, their secretary, the secretaries of Planning, Health, Education, 62
the regional commander of the Armed Forces, the commander of the regional Police Force, the regional 
director of Bienestar (Social Services), a representative of the Public Ministry,  a delegate of the Victims 
Unit, and two representatives of the mesas are required under law (Victims Unit, 2012). In practice, these 
meetings rarely have all required members. 
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Interview with Yanela   63
 It was, as usual, a hot day in Medellín when we met at a Plaza Mayor in 
Medellín. I was catching Yanela between meetings. She was coming from a 
television interview and had a few hours to talk before a fundraising meeting 
seeking to secure funds for a water pump and filter for a community of displaced 
persons in Riosucio, Chocó. I sat in the breezy shade of a large tree as she stepped 
out of her ride, a large black SUV with bullet proof glass and two armed guards. 
This was the highest level of the government’s Protocolo de Protecctión for social 
leaders under threat by armed groups.  Lesser degrees of protection include a 64
state funded cell phone with the local and national police on speed dial, or a 
bulletproof vest to wear when leaders leave their home. Other leaders have told 
me about their ambivalence towards these measures. The lesser measures are a 
joke they say, “What will a cell phone that doesn’t work outside of the cities and 
towns do where I live? Particularly, when there isn’t trust in the police’s 
willingness or ability to respond to threats of violence”. The armed guards often 
build personal relationships with the leaders, granting a degree of trust but it also 
creates a distance between the leader and their communities. “How does it look 
for me to ride around in a fancy car with armed men? It makes me look like the 
very people we are working against” (Cauca’s Departmental Representative, April 
 Pseudonym. Representative on Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa and the National Mesa.63
 This “Protocol of Protection” is one of the governments programs to protect participants in transitional 64
justice and other social leaders. The limits and problematics of this program are addressed in this and the 
next chapter.
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18, 2018). Various leaders have communicated that it leaves them with a sense of 
isolation, of disconnection from the communities they represent, and that it opens 
the possibility for closer surveillance of their work. If participating in transitional 
justice leads to persecution by armed groups, which then requires that leaders 
resort to protection schemes that cast suspicion on them for the communities they 
represent, is there effective representation through participation? 
 After a few friendly greetings, the guards asked to see and photograph my 
ID before walking away a short distance to keep watch during our interview.  
Sitting down under the tree we shared updates on mutual acquaintances and went 
through the interview protocol but before we got into the questions. Yanela 
interrupted, “I want to tell you about where I grew up. I want you to know that I 
live through my memories”. She described a childhood filled with beauty and 
wonder: a home built on a small island between two rivers surrounded by sandy 
beaches, trees filled with coconuts and guavas, easy fishing right down from her 
doorstep, a large community-run farm with corn, sugar cane, and plantain. She 
was raised by her mother and grandparents, the elders of their village, in the casa 
madre. Lost in her memories, she described a safe, loving, and egalitarian 
community where children played into the night without fear, families shared 
what each house produced and no one went without food and shelter, and 
conflicts were resolved through caring mediation by the larger community. 
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 Yanela reflects on the joy and privilege of this childhood, “This was a 
dream, my dream, that I woke up from to confront the armed conflict that had 
been destroying other’s lives for decades”. Armed groups began to make regular 
appearances in her community, each demanding support, and threatening reprisal 
for supporting others. Over time the FARC established a command center nearby 
and gained control of the area. They began visiting the caserio, demanding that 
the families sell them food.  This drew Yanela’s community into what is known 65
as la zona gris, the gray zone, an apparent, if forced, participation in the conflict 
through material support for an armed group. This gray zone is a key 
problematically named by victimized-survivors and their advocates in 
participating in transitional justice programs which often assume a clean division 
between victim and perpetrator. 
  One day, two soldiers found Yanela alone in her home and sexually 
assaulted her. Her mother found out and, against the protests of the rest of the 
family, went and complained to the FARC commander. Days later, several 
soldiers, including those involved in Yanela’s rape returned, attacked her home, 
murdered her mother and uncle, and displaced the rest of her family. Over the 
next few years, the displacement led her and her family from a military camp of 
hundreds, to a refugee camp with thousands of others, to an apartment in 
Apartadó, the local city. There, she began working as a domestic worker and met 
 A collection of homes forming a community but too small to be considered a village. These types of 65
residences for communal living are common throughout rural Colombia.
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a man who became her husband and together they had two children. She felt like 
her life was finally coming together. Yet, through these years, she began to feel 
the weight of the trauma she had experienced, as it came to affect all of her closest 
relationships, including with her husband and young children. She was living in a 
routine, but without a sense of presence, joy, or hope. “Gone were the days of my 
childhood, of joy, of being a strong outspoken girl. I lost my voice through those 
days of violence. I lost my will to live”.  
 It was in 2003 that a friend approached her, “They are starting to organize 
victims of the conflict and some people are being given homes” (Yanela, April 4, 
2018). Though Yanela had no desire to participate in victims’ organizing, she was 
tired of living with her mother-in-law and agreed to go. “Well, I left there without 
a new place to live but that initial meeting changed my life. From that day I 
started receiving care from a psychologist at the hospital in Apartadó”. The 
psychologist visits were scheduled for every eight days, but she insisted on going 
every day. “It was through those visits that I began to heal, began to understand 
that everything that had happened to me was not my fault. It was this experience 
that started me off organizing with victims”.  
 She began by working at a food bank and organizing the delivery of food 
to displaced persons and resettlement camps in Riosucio. Her organizing led her 
to Medellín, as she continued to pursue support for the communities of Chocó, all 
the while working several administrative jobs in factories and as a domestic 
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worker in private homes. It was in this period that the threats began. Calls telling 
her that what happened to her mother could happen to her. Calls stating the figure 
of the small sum it would take to have her murdered in Medellín or in Apartadó.  
 Instead of backing away, she redoubled her efforts, seeking the support of 
Ruta Pacifica, a national women’s organization addressing the armed conflict, to 
start her own women’s organizing and advocacy victim’s organization in Rio 
Sucio, Chocó in 2011. Her mother’s image became the symbol of the 
organization, seeking to educate women on their rights as victims of the armed 
conflict in transitional justice mechanisms and in creating grassroots projects to 
address issues of everyday violence. In 2013, she was invited to travel to Spain to 
highlight the plight of women and survivors of gendered and sexual violence 
under the armed conflict. Through this experience, local organizations nominated 
her to run for seats on the local, departmental, and national Mesas de Victimas. 
She won the slot for each of the mesas, becoming one of two national 
representatives for victims of sexual and gendered violence on the national Mesa. 
She has held these seats for over two terms. Yanela has taken this as a platform to 
advocate for the needs of her community while communicating to the nation and 
the international community the forms of violence that she and her community 
face. The threats against her life continue for her outspoken advocacy but she 
states, “I can’t keep quiet, because at this point if I do, I become an accomplice to 
the violence”. 
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 It was this work, her hard-earned expertise in the armed conflict and in 
victims’ organizing, that had led us to the interview, and eventually, to my 
questions about participation in transitional justice. Given her constant organizing 
and her position on mesas at three levels of government, her understanding of 
transitional justice and of victims’ participation is broad and grounded in lived 
experience.  
Critiques of Participation by Representatives to the Mesas 
 Yanela’s narrative rests, as so many other personal stories in Colombia do, 
between the particular and the general. It tells her story, or at least a very brief 
version of it. It also tells the story of her family, of her community, and of many in 
her region affected by FARC presence and violence in the 1990s. Yet, if we blur 
the details, the armed group involved or the region, the story becomes a much 
broader one.  It is a story of sexual violence, endemic in this armed conflict. It is 66
a story of forced displacement, shared with almost 8 million other Colombians, 
according to official figures.  It is also a story of a victimized-survivor finding 67
support through the efforts of victims’ organizing and finding personal meaning in 
participating in the work of transitional justice. 
 The Unidad de Victimas has registered 8,944,137 individual victims of the armed conflict (Unidad de 66
Victimas, 2020). The true figure of the number of people subject to a human rights violation is much 
higher, given the widespread hesitancy and inability of victimized-survivors to register. Though Yanela 
was subject to violence at the hands of the FARC, a guerrilla group, it is important to reiterate that the 
vast majority of the gravest violations of human rights occurred at the hands of paramilitary forces 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2018).  
 The U.N. Refugee Agency under the Human Rights Council, placed the total number of internally 67
displaced persons in Colombia at 7,671,124 in 2018, the last year figures were published. (UNHCR 2018) 
This doesn’t include Colombians who have left the country as refugees, asylees, or other emigrants.    
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 In the course of my research, I interviewed five different representatives 
serving on municipal, departmental, and national mesas across Antioquia. Among 
these five were a member of the Transitional Justice Committee for Medellín’s 
Mesa, the president of Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa, and a representative to the 
National Mesa serving on the Gender and Sexual Violence Committee. The 
resonances among their stories were astounding. They were all forcibly displaced 
persons, fleeing violence from more rural parts of the country. They were all 
incredibly dedicated to their work organizing victimized-survivors, despite the 
significant personal and financial burdens incurred from their work. Perhaps most 
relevant to this dissertation, they shared similar critiques of work of the mesas, 
and the limits to effective participation.  I also interviewed two directors of the 
Victims’ Unit in Medellín, who echoed the concerns of the representatives.   68
 The critiques they offered of the work of the mesas, echoed that of those 
organizing and working with the Peace Councils. Many named spotty 
participation by state officials in convening or attending meetings, or inadequate 
coordination. “Officials often miss important meetings, and when they do come, 
they fail to invite us representatives. Other times, they call me with less than a 
few hours notice to show up to a meeting across town or even in another city” 
(Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). They also echoed 
the experiences of representatives from the workshop in Cauca, stating that there 
 This does not include many other informal conversations with representatives to mesas, including my 68
participation in the First Departmental Meeting of Representatives in Cauca.
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is support for public facing work but institutions never have resources available 
for reparations or development projects. “We can educate our people about their 
rights, run campaigns, hold workshops, hand out flyers, but how do we look when 
nothing happens and we can only share our frustrations”(Medellín’s Municipal 
Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018).  They discussed the complexities of 
navigating a fractured state often at odds with its own goals. “We would work 
together for months with the Ombudsman’s Office and the Victims’ Unit, making 
plans for the security of our community, but then after months of ignoring us, a 
general shows up and tells us our plans are inoperable. End of story” (Medellín’s 
Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). These limitations to 
participation are essential to grasp the ambivalence of the state’s approach to 
transitional justice. They represent the real limits of political will across state 
institutions and are alone enough to collapse efforts for transitional justice.  
 Yet, compounding these bureaucratic limitations are personal ones, 
themselves structural and widespread. Nearly all of the representatives I 
interviewed named personal challenges in their work. They made clear the links 
between their personal circumstances and the broader politics of war, peace, and 
transitional justice. “They are killing us with the issue of our subsistence. You 
have to understand that the great majority of us are women, and almost all of us 
are the heads of our households. This is my job 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. My 
phone never stops. Yet for all this, I get paid 82,000 pesos a month. How are we 
supposed to feed our families?” (Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, 
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April 10, 2018).  The issue of basic livelihood was prominent amongst all of the 69
representatives I interviewed. Many were in a position of financial precarity 
before their forced displacement, others, despite some resources, have struggled 
since leaving their families and places of birth. Regardless, they were unified in 
stating that the meager stipend afforded to them by the mesas was inadequate in 
supporting themselves and their families.  
 The work itself presents a burden in terms of time and cost as active 
representatives become key figures in civil society connecting state institutions, 
non-profit organizations, and victims’ groups across Medellín and Antioquia. 
“Being on the mesa means staying connected with civil society groups and 
institutions. I travel daily across the city and often to the territories.  The stipend 70
doesn’t even cover my transportation costs.”  “This year, seven representatives 71
left the mesa [before the end of their term] because of their economic situation” 
(Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). “We have a very 
powerful mesa. This is a way they keep us in our place.(Medellín’s Municipal 
Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). 
 Others named a struggle with officials who dumped work on them but 
refused to offer support, for example, dropping off hundreds of pages of drafted 
 Approximately $26.69
 Territories, in Colombia, refers to rural areas, often implying Afro-Colombian and Indigenous 70
communities. The use of the term territory suggests a particular politics of cultural and political 
autonomy.
 Representative to Medellín’s Municipal Mesa.  71
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transitional justice policy and telling them to offer detailed commentary and 
community response in a limited time frame. “Hardly any leaders in these 
processes have a higher education, high school at best. The Victims’ Unit 
sometimes say they will support our studies, but the money never materializes. 
How are we supposed to work to support our families, study, and be leaders at the 
same time? Impossible” (Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa Representative, April 7, 
2018). “I was a school teacher, but from a very rural area. I had never studied law, 
now I go to university, work, and do my work on the Mesa. I don’t know how I 
manage but if I wasn’t studying law, I couldn’t be an effective representative” 
(Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa Representative, April 7, 2018). 
 Lastly, many named the psychological burden they carry. “This work gives 
us direction and focuses our energy, but we still don’t have the kinds of 
physiological support we need for what we lived through” (Antioquia’s 
Departmental Mesa Representative, April 7, 2018). “Sometimes I wake up in the 
middle of the night, drenched in sweat, other times I don’t sleep at all. The 
pressure of it all feels like too much sometimes, and the threats don’t stop” 
(Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). Here too the state 
fails to create the conditions necessary for a permanent and effective participation 
by victimized-survivors. 
 The Brazilian anthropologist, Silvia Monroy Álvarez (2013), in her study 
of violence and community responses in Urabá, names a generalized state of 
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“permanent present” (p. 7).  She says that her study “is about violence and some 72
of its effects, that are also its causes” that is the “propensity, tendency, inclination, 
or predisposition to live life in its actuality” (p. 7). This orientation, both temporal 
and cosmological, she claims, is product of the struggle for survival, and 
reproduces the need for short term solutions to dire problems. “They [the 
community members she worked with] do not return to a historic past, nor an 
anticipated future, organized and directed, rather they are focused on the 
possibilities and hopelessness of the present” (p. 7). This state of distress and 
precarity, made quotidian, is both a result of and reason for the conflict. People, 
under these conditions, struggle to imagine and work for collective change 
become mired in violence, often contributing to its reproduction in the daily 
compromises that survival requires. 
    Against a larger state narrative of transition, the optimism of change and 
more peaceful futures against a violent and turbulent past, many of my 
interviewees’ reflections both refute and echo Álvarez’s understanding. Caught in 
the ambivalence of their experience, they name the necessity of hope, of the 
possibilities for social transformation that they work for. Indeed, many offer 
testimony to the improvements they have already contributed to and witnessed. 
“The Accords have made a difference. Violence is not what it used to be, I can 
now cross the river and visit my grandchildren, I can now farm my family’s land. 
 She names her study an anthropography, rather than an ethnography, seeking to focus and name the 72
particular and refute any attempt to render universal any of her observations .
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Things are getting better here and that helps to continue working” (Brisas 
Community President, March 26, 2018). Yet the pressures of organizing and 
participating in peace processes are relentless. Representatives and leaders all 
name the multiple pressures they endure: their efforts for connection with a larger 
society that at times suspects them for their participation, questioning their 
possible allegiances to armed groups or their self-interest; the burden of past and 
ongoing traumas that haunt their everyday; the quotidian struggles of economic 
precarity, racism, and sexism; and the never ending threats against their lives and 
the unknowability of the origin or seriousness of those threats. In each of these 
cases, the state has a responsibility. To ensure effective and ongoing participation 
of victimized-survivors in transitional justice, the state must support their work 
materially and discursively. It must be unified in ending decades-long counter-
insurgency tactics and discourses that cast suspicion on those organizing for peace 
and justice. It must provide for the education, mental and physical health of 
participants, and daily subsistence of those participating in transitional justice. 
Most minimally, it must secure the basic right to non-repetition, the right to 
participate in politics and governance, the right to name past harm without that 
work making one a target for future violence. These responsibilities are basic and 
necessary, without meeting them, not only is the work of transitional justice 




 In the last two chapters I have outlined two important mechanisms for 
community and victims’ participation in transitional justice including their legal 
and bureaucratic frameworks, Peace Councils and the mesas. Through weaving in 
the experiences and perspectives of my interviewees, many who occupy multiple 
positions as scholars, advocates, and researchers, as well as victimized-survivors 
and participants of transitional justice, I have offered a genealogical and grounded 
critique of these mechanisms focused on their effects of local and marginalized 
communities.  Analysis of political economy, the logic of counter-insurgency, 73
and the fabric of Colombian governmentally, have been woven in as necessary to 
give context and explicate the critiques of my interviewees.  
 The next chapter, my conclusion, may seem to introduce new substantive 
social facts: the current landscape of violence, state responses, the state of the 
peace accord. Yet, my intention, in addition to giving context to the actuality of 
participation in Colombian transitional justice, is that these social facts are 
themselves an intervention in overly optimistic or teleological approaches to 
human rights. They, like much of the facts I present in this work, are abrupt. They 
represent a contradiction to and a departure from the linear narratives of progress 
reproduced by the state. They serve as an interruption to legalist understandings of 
 It is genealogical in that it draws from a combination of local knowledge and critical scholarship. It is 73
grounded in that these knowledges are drawn from the past and ongoing experiences of those living under 
a country at war, victimized-survivors, advocates, organizers, researches, and social leaders. Each of the 
persons I talked to during my time in Colombia occupied several of these positions.
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transitional justice that focus on the structure of law and longstanding debates that 
tend to animate the discourse. They make plain that what is at stake is not simply 
the success of a legal and bureaucratic instrument of governance and human 
rights, but the lives of people and the fabric of society. This is what is at stake. 
This is what demands our attention and must animate our understanding and 
solidarity.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion  
  
“The victim who is able to articulate the situation of the victim has ceased to be a 
victim: he or she has become a threat.” (Baldwin, 2011, p. 134) 
“Nos están matando.”    74
 While in the previous section I have outlined some of the institutional, 
bureaucratic, and structural limits to meaningful and transformative participation, 
I have only made passing mention to the true catastrophe of the Peace Process: the 
widespread systematic murder of social leaders and human rights defenders. Over 
a hundred social leaders and human rights defenders have been murdered each 
year for their political participation since the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016. 
The official tally varies by institution depending on methodology. The United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia places 
the figure at over 400 since the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016, though they 
acknowledge their limited ability to track and confirm cases and note a particular 
slowdown in their counting in 2020 due to the COVID 19 pandemic (Human 
Rights Watch, 2021).  Colombia’s Ombudsman’s office lists 712 documented 75
killings while Somos Defensores and Indepaz, Colombian human rights 
 “They are killing us.” Both a quote from an interview with a representative to a mesa, and a widespread 74
rallying call amongst social leaders.
 The pandemic has been devastating to the already overburdened Colombian healthcare system, 75
resulting in widespread infection and death. The quarantine, mandated nationally, is understood as having 
contributed to the increased assassination of human rights defenders and social leaders through the 
restriction of their movement. This restriction facilitated their targeting by armed groups who either 
evaded or were ignored by state forces policing the quarantine. 
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organizations tracking the murders, have documented 600 and 971 cases 
respectively (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Indepaz, 2020).  While the total 76
number of deaths in Colombia related to the armed conflict has decreased 
significantly since the signing of the Peace Accord and the demobilization of the 
FARC, the numbers of targeted assassinations of social leaders and human rights 
defenders has steadily grown.  
  Despite statements made by some officials in the Duque administration 
asserting that these killings are unrelated to political participation, each of the 
organizations above have, through their own research, confirmed that the 
murdered person was a social leader or human rights defender and was targeted 
for their work.  The OHCHR provided Human Rights Watch with a 77
categorization of leaders murdered since 2016. The main categories included trade 
unionists, campesino leaders, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous leaders (who were 
disproportionately represented among those targeted).  The report does not 78
address overlapping categories but makes clear that by far the greatest number of 
leaders assassinated were defenders of human rights actively involved in 
 The first three figures were compiled in an early 2021 report from Human Rights Watch in which they 76
communicated directly with this organization: OHCHR. (https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/lacregion/
pages/coindex.aspx), Defensoria del Pueblo (https://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/), Somos Defensores 
(https://somosdefensores.org). Indepaz, The Institute for the Study of Development and Peace, maintains 
a daily register of murders reported by civil society organizations. The comprehensiveness of this method 
explains their higher number and points to the even greater number of killings that go unreported. 
 See below for elaboration of these statements and other state responses. 77
 “According to OHCHR, approximately 16 percent of all the human rights defenders killed since 2016 78
were Indigenous leaders. Only 4.4 percent of Colombia’s population is estimated to be Indigenous.”
(Human Rights Watch, 2021, p. 25).
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Colombian participatory organizations. The largest single group, with 130 cases 
of the 412 documented by the OHCHR), was members of Neighborhood Action 
Committees, another state legislated and coordinated mechanism of social 
organization and political participation that functions across the country towards 
the “defense of human rights” (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Somos Defensores, 
2019).  While this Human Rights Watch report using OHCHR data only 79
documents 10 cases of “Victims’ Rights Activists,” interviews with leaders, as 
well as other reports, evidence the systematic targeting and killing of these 
activists. Indeed, given that positions on Victims’ Mesas are elected to specific 
terms of service and often overlap with other leadership roles, there is a lack of 
information and general undercounting of the murder of these representatives.  80
Yet, by all accounts, those involved in transitional justice in general, and in the 
implementation of the Peace Accord in particular, have paid heavily for their 
activism. Over half of the murders occurred in areas with Territorial Development 
Programs, initiatives created by the government addressing the requirements of 
Rural Reform and Reparation in the Peace Accords (Human Rights Watch, 2020, 
 The Neighborhood Action Committees (Juntas de Action Comunal) have a long international history 79
originating in the anti-colonial struggles of the mid twentieth century. They emerged in Colombia in the 
ashes of La Violencia to address the lack of state presence and effective governance in rural areas 
following the civil war. They were first supported by the Colombian state in 1958 with Law 19, and have 
more recently been revived and re-invested in through Law 743 of 2002 and Decree 2350 of 2003(Somos 
Defensores, 2019). Many of my interviewees have also served on these committees.
 Many prominent cases though have been documented. To give just two examples, I note the murders of 80
Jonny Castro, who served on a municipal Victim’s Mesa in the department of Nariño, and of Jorge Solano 
of the municipal Victim’s Mesa of Ocaña en North Santander, both killed in November of 2020 (Radio 
Nacional, 2020) (Unidad de Victimas, 2020). Indeed, this chapter could easily be filled with the names of 
past representatives of Mesas who were murdered for their work.
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p. 27).  Municipalities with active or planned programs of coca substitution are 81
also disproportionately represented by cases of murdered leaders. In general, rural 
areas, particularly those with the presence of armed groups and with active illegal 
economies account for the great majority of assassinations (Human Rights Watch, 
2020; Indepaz, 2021; Somos Defensores, 2020). Also over represented are areas 
that were formally occupied by FARC guerrilla forces that have since 
demobilized.  
 All of this is to say, that it is precisely those areas most of concern to 
transitional justice programs, those upon which the success of these efforts 
depends on leadership from and collaboration with local communities, that are 
seeing the greatest number of targeted killings with the intention to silence 
dissent, suppress organizing, and minimize political participation. The deaths, of 
course, represent only a fraction of violent acts conducted by armed groups meant 
to scare civil society into compliance, and these acts are increasing in scale. In 
2020 alone, the Ombudsman office registered 972 violent acts against social 
leaders and human rights defenders of which 182 were assassinations, another 51 
were attempted assassinations and 607 were serious threats. Other acts included 
kidnapping, arbitrary detention, forced displacement, and other unnamed acts 
(González Gaitán, 2020).  
 PDET: Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial81
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State Response 
 In contrast to killings in decades past, this most recent surge in the murder 
of Colombian leaders has not been ignored by the national and international press, 
foreign states, or international human rights organizations or NGOs. Indeed, the 
ever-growing array of transitional justice frameworks and the push towards 
diplomatic ends of the civil war, have come in large part from the efforts of 
Colombian social movements and international pressure. Yet, much like the 
structures of participation available to the Colombian citizenry and the transitional 
justice programs in place, the state’s response to the systematic murder of leaders 
has been both overly complex, fragmented, and ultimately ineffectual.  
 The 2021 Human Rights Watch report, entitled “Left Undefended,” 
outlined fifteen different mechanisms and committees created by the government 
to address the murders and protect leaders, the majority of which were created 
under the Duque administration. They conclude that these programs have been 
ineffectual for a variety of reasons, including inadequate implementation, lack of 
funding, tepid official participation, or untimely programming and responses. 
Often the announced programs are far reaching and broad in scope only to be 
severely limited geographically or in actual planning and implementation. The 
large number of programs create confusion, a duplication of efforts, and 
contribute to poor coordination between agencies, who are often unaware of each 
other’s work.  
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There are transitional justice committees, security committees, prevention 
subcommittees, sessions of the Inter-Agency Commission for Rapid 
Response to Early Warnings, meetings of the Program of Early Action.... 
We talk a lot but implement little,” an official from the Human Rights 
Ombudsperson’s Office told Human Rights Watch. (Human Rights Watch, 
2021, p. 68) 
 Social leaders are left to figure out what mechanism or committee might 
best serve their needs, often in moments of great distress following threats, 
assassination attempts, and acts of forced displacement. Local communities often 
lack trust in these mechanisms and not only due to their obtuse complexity and 
ineffectiveness. The Duque administration, in particular, has contributed to this 
suspicion by failing to call to order committees or hold scheduled meetings 
regarding mechanisms to address the murders. They have appointed officials who 
are seen as oppositional to the peace process and are unreliable in their posts. For 
example, in 2019, Duque appointed General Leonardo Barrero as director of the 
Timely Action Plan for Prevention and the Protection of Human Rights 
Defenders, Community and Social Leaders and Journalists (PAO) despite his 
publicly acknowledged involvement in covering up extrajudicial executions 
committed by the military and then seeking to interfere with ongoing 
investigations (Human Rights Watch, 2021).  
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 Also egregious has been the continual denial of the murders. The Minister 
of Defense, Guillermo Botero, from 2018 to 2019, stated that in regards to social 
protest, “detrás de eso siempre hay mafias organizadas. ¡Pero mafias de verdad, 
mafias supranacionales!” (Verdad Abierta, 2018, para. 1).  His predecessor, Luis 82
Carlos Villegas, also appointed by President Duque, stated, to national and 
international infamy, that “La inmensa mayoría de muertes de líderes sociales se 
deben a peleas de vecinos, faldas y por rentas ilícitas” (Verdad Abierta, 2018, 
para. 2).  While these statements in no way represent the entirety of the 83
Colombian state, they do represent a particular approach to political dissent and 
social movements that has long been held by sectors of the government and 
business elite: that all resistance to their interests represents a form of 
unacceptable subversion, an internal enemy.  This concept serves to mark, 84
stigmatize, and judge any Colombian. The communist, the leftist, the social 
leader, the defender of human rights, the labor organizer, the student, he who has 
nothing to lose because of their condition of poverty, is labeled an internal enemy 
and an enemy must be pursued and eliminated (Torres Vásquez, et al., 2020).  85
 The parallels in the dysfunction of mechanisms of protection for social 
leaders and human rights defenders with those for political participation, 
 Behind all that there are always organized mafias. Real mafias, international mafias!82
 The vast majority of the deaths of social leaders are due to fights between neighbors, due to sexual 83
jealousy and illegal activities.
 Indeed, they were denounced by other state official and institutions at the time.84
  My translation.85
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particularly concerning victims’ mesas and peace processes, are not simply 
notable. In essence, they are the same failures occurring in the implementation of 
transitional justice. Rural reform, land restitution, reparation, processes of truth 
and justice all rely on robust and safe participation by those left most vulnerable 
by the armed conflict. Victimized survivors must be able to name their 
experiences, gather and organize with others, and claim what is due to them 
through effective participation as outlined in the Peace Accord. The complex, 
fractured and ambivalent stance of the state, in regards to the protection of social 
leaders and defenders of human rights are a part of a larger failure in the 
implementation of transitional justice.  
The Political Economy of War and Peace 
 This new genocide of social leaders has another recent historical analog in 
Colombia’s history of violence - the targeted assassination of members of Union 
Patriotica (UP) in the 1990s (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018; Karl, 
2019). The UP was a political party formed a decade earlier through three 
ultimately failed peace processes involving the FARC. Despite the collapse of 
these efforts to negotiate a lasting peace, the UP emerged as an “alternative path,” 
offering Colombians a viable third party in opposition to the traditional Liberal 
and Conservative parties dominated respectively by urban and rural elites (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018).  This non-violent political party won 
unprecedented victories for the Colombian left but its movement was eroded and 
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ultimately ended through the murder of over four thousand of its members by the 
Armed Forced of Colombia and allied paramilitary groups (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2018). This systematic killing served to escalate the civil war, 
driving many former guerrilla soldiers back into the armed conflict. At stake, for 
political elites and capitalist forces, was the balance of power in Colombia. In the 
face of mass social mobilization and an emergent non-violent political force, 
violence was dispersed from key sites of conflict between armed groups, coming 
to inhabit an ever-increasing portion of the Colombian landscape. 
 The paramilitary forces behind many of the murders of the UP found 
financial and political support, including through legal avenues, in the 1990s. 
With the official and unofficial support of the state, they extended their actions in 
a territorial struggle for control of land. Deals were made with narco-trafficking 
cartels to secure land for coca production. National and multinational agricultural 
corporations supported their war on local communities in a scarcely hidden bid to 
expand their own territorial holdings. Various forms of mining including gold and 
coal, as well as petroleum and coal extraction depended on the terrorization of 
campesino, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities to gain access to 
remote areas. Even large multi-national development projects building mega dams 
and commercial ports exercised their interests through paramilitary violence. In 
the last and first decade of the twentieth century, their mass and brutal campaign 
of violence, dwarfed the numbers of human rights violations attributed to other 
armed groups including the Armed Forces of Colombia and the various guerrilla 
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organizations. Through massacres, rape, torture, dismemberment, forced 
disappearance, and targeted assassination, paramilitary violence drove mass 
displacement, making Colombia the country with the greatest number of 
internally displaced people. This violence existed alongside and in response to a 
history of social mobilization and legal reform that created ever greater 
opportunities for claims to land and resources. 
  The Uribe-backed demobilization of the AUC, the largest 
paramilitary umbrella organization, introduced new frameworks for transitional 
justice, including the introduction of the legal category for victims and entitlement 
to specific rights. Yet, it did little to stem paramilitary violence, instead fracturing 
their organization and providing new opportunities for mergers and collaborations 
with narco-trafficking cartels. It was not until the signing of the Peace Accord 
with the FARC in 2016, followed by the agreed to demobilization of the great 
majority of active guerrilla soldiers, that Colombia has had a significant lull in the 
number of massacres, newly forcibly displaced persons, and total number of 
deaths due to the armed conflict. Since the signing of the Peace Accord, mass 
displacement has lost priority as the main strategy of economic development. 
National and international attention was instead on transitional justice in 
Colombia. Claims to land restitution by victims of forced displacement and 
petitions for the granting of communal territories of Afro-Colombian and 
Indigenous communities increased. New numbers of victimized survivors of the 
armed conflict came out of the shadows to register themselves as victims, claim 
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restitution and reparation, participate in promised development projects, and seek 
justice. Their bravery, encouraged by promises of safety, rights, and 
transformation by the state, has been met with a new wave of violence. The 
systematic killing of human rights defenders and social leaders outlined above 
threatens to unravel the gains made by the Peace Process, plunging the country 
back into unrestrained violence. In 2020, the UN documented 66 massacres in 
Colombia, resulting in the deaths of 255 persons (UN News, 2020). Urabá, Bajo 
Cauca, el Chocó, among other regions have seen armed conflict between the 
military, paramilitary, guerrilla, and narco-cartels resume, to the terror of local 
communities. “Colombia has never had a state of post-conflict, we can only talk 
about a state of post-accord” (Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa Representative, 
April 7, 2018). And yet, the state of the Accord and its implementation, some four 
and a half years later, is still not guaranteed.  
State of the Peace Accord 
 The Kroc Institute released an official report in August of 2020 
documenting the state of the implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord. It offers a  
point-by-point analysis, revealing the failures of the Colombian state to secure 
peace and pursue meaningful transitional justice. Below I summarize the findings 
of the report relevant to this dissertation beginning with Point 1 on Rural Reform. 
 Four years in, about half of the PDET (Territorial Development Plans) and 
PATR (Action Plans for Regional Development) have been written, though no 
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meaningful progress has been made towards their implementation (Kroc, 2020). 
The Peace Accord also provided a framework for the distribution of over 12 
million hectares in 12 years to landless farmers as well as Indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities. While 30% of this land has been secured in a land trust, 
no land has yet to be granted (Kroc, 2020). This not only represents a lack of 
concrete progress towards rural reform, but must be considered against the fact 
that 98% of murders of social leaders have occurred in municipalities marked for 
such efforts (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Areas marked for programs for the 
substitution of illegal crops under Point 4 for the Peace Accord also contain a 
disproportionate number of social leaders murdered. The Kroc Institute (2020) 
report documents that only 6% of these programs have been implemented. 
 In regards to Point 2 on Political Participation, a key part of the Accord, 
and the main focus of this dissertation, the Kroc Institute found that the 
government had initiated less than half of the programs stipulated in the accord. 
Of these, no major legislation required to implement participation has passed in 
the Colombian congress. These failed projects included the Special Transitory 
Peace Voting Districts, which would have created 16 special seats in the House of 
Representatives for representatives of victims’ organizations (Kroc, 2020). The 
report also notes the failure of the state to provide adequate technical or financial 
support for the proper functioning of national and territorial peace councils (Kroc, 
2020).  
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 Without doubt, the most successful part of the Peace Accord, occurred 
under point 3, addressing the “end of the conflict.” The UNHCR recognized the 
demobilization of 13,202 FARC combatants by 2019 of which 12,940 participated 
in state reincorporation programs (Kroc, 2020). These persons represent the vast 
majority of FARC forces, effectively ending the existence of a national FARC 
guerrilla force. Yet the promises made to these ex-combatants have yet to be 
fulfilled with just under half of programs for land access and development 
projects directed towards their well-being having been completed. More 
worrisome, and in line with the larger issues outlined in this dissertation, safety 
for their participation has not been secured. Since the time of their demobilization 
to the end of 2020, 244 ex-FARC combatants have been murdered according to 
the UN verification mission (UN News, 2020). 
 Point 5, concerning the Victims of the armed conflict, has seen mixed 
results. This includes the creation of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, 
Reparation and Non-Recurrence (SIVJRNR) and of 22 Casas de la Verdad across 
the country offering education on human rights and taking testimony of victims of 
the armed conflict (Kroc, 2020). Cases prosecuting perpetrators of human rights 
violations are ongoing, though without the investigation or prosecution of third 
party intellectual authors of the acts. This makes the addressing of the underlying 
causes of the human rights violations impossible, and does nothing to transform 
the conditions that perpetrate violence today. Notably, no programs related to the 
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guarantee of non-repetition under this Point have been completed, and those that 
have commenced are deemed minimal (Kroc, 2020).  
Questions of Ambivalence 
 This report, of course, only confirms what leaders, including those I’ve 
interviewed, have been saying about the failures of the implementation of the 
accord. They say that much has been proposed, though little has been done. Those 
efforts are often confusing and contradictory. That they are holding up their end of 
the deal, to talk to their community, to organize, to document, to propose, and to 
plan. They give testimony, not only to the crime to which they were subjected, but 
to the conditions of their lives that create the context for the armed conflict. 
Almost always this comes at great risk and cost. They sometimes become marked 
as troublemakers, as leftists, as guerrilla sympathizers or collaborators. They 
come under the watch of armed groups, tracked for their activities and the threat it 
represents to their interests. Often, the outcome is worse, another headline, 
another statistic; more meaningfully, another absence in the community, another 
family member missing, grieved. And yet, for others, another reason to step up, to 
speak out, to organize, and to participate.  
 The state, on the other hand, risks little and gains much. Talks are initiated, 
committees are formed, plans are sometimes drafted, but the real work of 
financing and implementing community development programs has yet to begin. 
At the state’s behest, coca farmers have enrolled in programs for the substitution 
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of their crops, but rather than receiving the technical and material support needed 
to transition their farms, they are subject to ongoing state fumigations and left to 
defend themselves against the violence of cartels.  Victims’ rights leaders are 86
made to gather for workshops, trainings, and photo ops. Through this participation 
they become another kind of number, a tally of projects initiated, efforts 
underway, proof of the good use of international funding and of the good will of 
the Colombian state. 
 These processes, of course, are necessary for participatory transitional 
justice. For TJ to strive to be bottom up, to incorporate the voices of victims, to 
take seriously the realities on the ground, vulnerable people must participate. 
They witness, they organize, they document, they plan, and they work. Of course, 
this labor has always been present and does not depend on the state, or on 
international bodies, or on law. Indeed, social movements in Colombia not only 
preceded the creation of transitional justice frameworks, they called them into 
being and gave them shape through mass mobilization, protest, and political 
pressure.  
 Through participation, the Colombian state and its most powerful 
stakeholders have found a way to channel civil society energy into a Kafkaesque 
maze of bureaucratic procedure. Commissions are made, at times convened and at 
other times not. Methodology is drafted. Timelines are set, then extended, only to 
 Yet another example of how, time and time again, a state institution beings work in good faith only to 86
have their actions undermined and contradicted by another.
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be extended again or indeterminately postponed. Officials join and civil society 
groups are asked to participate. Or sometimes not. In particularly successful 
commissions, plans are drafted and circulated but then rarely implemented. 
Implementation itself, when initiated, is partial, scattered, underfunded and 
insufficient. This is the story of participation in Colombian governance. Since the 
beginning of the implementation of national transitional justice programs such as 
the Peace and Justice, the 2011 Victims’ law, and the 2016 Peace Accords, it may 
be said that this story is being echoed, channeling energy, effort, and resources 
into bureaucracy that allows for long lists of efforts underway and actions taken 
but does little to change either the conditions of violence that permeate the 
everyday or the political economy that underlies this violence.  
 Through the last few chapters, I have attempted to not only present a sense 
of what participation in transitional justice in Colombia looks like, how it is 
structured, and how it is experienced by some community and victims’ 
representatives, but to highlight a thread of internal conflict I am naming 
ambivalence. These simultaneous and contradictory experiences, structures, 
bureaucracies, positions, and goals in relation to transitional justice run through 
state institutions, officials, civil society, social movements, and participants 
themselves. Indeed, how does one understand rule of law in the context of a 
conflicted democracy, let alone in the context of efforts towards transitional 
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justice through an ongoing conflict?  While the application of law is always 87
uneven, more so in countries with high levels of social inequality and social 
division, Colombia is remarkable in the gap between the letter of human rights 
and transitional justice law and its application. Political participation by civil 
society, and most importantly, by victimized-survivors, has helped propel the 
creation of a dense tapestry of legal structures for truth, justice, and social 
transformation. Yet, the interests of national and international capital and political 
elites, funneled through majoritarian discourse, produce the conditions for the 
vitiation of these legal frameworks, and an ongoing state of violence and 
exploitation.  
 Critical scholarship has addressed these tensions within the larger field of 
human rights, naming fundamental ambivalences in the formulation of rights 
based discourse and its application. When Rancière asks, “Who is the subject of 
human rights?”, concluding that it cannot be an essential universal figure such as 
“Man” or “Citizen,” but rather that these are political categories that are contested 
and under continual recreation, I am drawn to reflect on a more particular 
question: Who is the victim as subject of rights in Colombian transitional justice? 
(Golder, 2015, p. 90). Indeed, individuals, scholars, social movements, and now 
Colombian law, has redefined this subject countless times, with consequential 
effects in terms of organizing, politics, policy, and jurisprudence. The subject of 
 If rule of law assumes the equal application of law across the body politic, then the notion of a 87
conflicted democracy itself acknowledges the failure to meet this standard.  
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rights, a victim of the Colombian civil war, or otherwise, is inherently in an 
ambivalent position. To seek to ground the category in a concept of humanity, or 
conversely through a reductive binary of perpetrator and victim, is inherently and 
unavoidably exclusionary. As we ask, What is left behind in the defining of the 
human, historically, and in our present?, so must we ask, What is at stake in our 
conception of the victim, and who does it leave out? Conversely, we must see the 
potential of the mutability of these categories. Who may emerge as a subject to 
claim rights? How can such an emergence fundamentally alter rights discourse, 
and the structures through which claims are made and addressed? 
Additionally, we must, as scholars of transitional justice, take seriously the 
Foucauldian questions of subject formation. In claiming rights as victims, how are 
the subjects of participation produced? What logics, particularly those of counter-
insurgency and capitalism, inform this production? Who once again is left out? 
What effect does participation, made available to such subjects, have on the larger 
politics of, for example, social movements? These questions in turn must also be 
asked of the state and its strategies of governance. If the state sees peace and 
development though essentially capitalist, extractivist, and neoliberal forms, what 
forms of participation are left to those critical of how these very values produce 
and reproduce armed conflict and mass violence? 
 The research presented in this dissertation does not answer these 
questions, though they have informed my inquiry. Instead, my hope is that by 
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offering a perspective on the structures of participation in transitional justice in 
Colombia, and focusing on the experiences of victimized-survivors of the armed 
conflict and victim’s representatives in such participation, I have contributed to a 
conversation with others willing to address difficult questions. By focusing on the 
ambivalent nature of transitional justice, in the history of Colombia and past 
accords, in the posture and efforts of the state, and most importantly by listening 
to the perspectives and experiences of participants, I hope to belie both the 
hopeful optimism that sees the work of peace and justice in Colombia as complete 
and the deterministic pessimism that nothing can ever change. On the contrary, 
the state of violence and the work of peace and justice in Colombia is always in 
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Appendix A  
Timeline 
MARCH 2018 
1st and 2nd weeks: First round of interviews with CEPO team members. Finalize 
preparation for site visits. 
3rd and 4th weeks: Site visits to the municipalities of Dabeiba, Remedios, Anorí, 
Ituango y Vigía del fuerte. 
APRIL 2018 
1st and 2nd weeks: Second round of interviews with CEPO team members. 
Support in compilation, transcription, and  translation of CEPO’s interviews from 
site visits. 
3rd and 4th weeks: Conduct interviews with members of institutional bodies and 
social movement leaders. Continue to support in compilation, transcription, and  
translation of CEPO’s interviews from site visits. 
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Appendix B  
Sample Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews 
Entrevista con miembros del CEPO 
Interviews with CEPO team members 
Fecha:_______________  
No.__________________  
Donde naciste? Donde fuiste criado? 
Where you born? Where were you raised? 
Que estas estudiando/ enseñando en la Universidad de Antioquia? 
What are you studying/teaching at the Universidad de Antioquia? 
Porque decidiste estudiar/ trabajar en esta disciplina? 
Why did you decide to study/ work in this discipline? 
Cuales son tus primeros recuerdos del conflicto armado en Colombia, tal vez tus primeros 
tres recuerdos? 
What are your first memories of the armed conflict in Colombia, perhaps your first three 
memories? 
Cual fue la primera vez que oíste tus padres hablar del conflicto? 
When did you first hear your parents talk about the conflict? 
De lo que has estudiado y de lo que recuerdas, que es el conflicto armado? 
From what you have studies and from what you remember, what is this armed conflict? 
Que piensas son algunas de las causas del conflicto? 
What do you think are some of the causes of the conflict? 
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz? 
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord in general is progressing? 
Quien son las victimas del conflicto armado? 
Who are the victims of the armed conflict? 
Cual es el papel de víctimas en el Acuerdo de Paz? 
What is the role of victims in the Peace Accord? 
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Cual es el papel del gobierno en e Acuerdo de Paz?  
What is the role of the government in the Peace Accord? 
Que deberes tiene el gobierno a las víctimas del conflicto armado?  
What obligations dos the government have to victims of the the armed conflict? 
Piensas que el Acuerdo cumple con normas nacionales y internacionales? 
Do you think the Accord conforms to national and international norms? 
Cual es el papel del CEPO en el proceso de paz? 
What is CEPO’s role in the peace process? 
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz en los municipios que vamos a 
visitar? 
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord is progressing in the 
communities we are visiting? 
Como están participando las victimas en la implementación del Acuerdo? 
How are victims participating in the implementation of the Accord? 
Que piensas que vas a ver en estas visitas? Como piensa que el Acuerdo de Paz ha 
afectado la vida en estos municipios? 
What do you think you will see on these visits? How do you think the Peace Accord has 
affected life in these communities? 
Como ves la situación de derechos humanos y seguridad en estos municipios? 
How do you understand the state of human rights and security in these municipalities? 
Que piensas que vas a aprender en estas visitas? 
What do you think you will learn on these visits? 
Hay algunas preguntas que tu crees son esenciales para las entrevistas que vas hacer in 
estas visitas? 
Are there any questions that you think are essential for the interviews you will conduct on 
these visits? 
Que entiendes del concepto de Justicia Transicional? 
What do you understand by Transitional Justice? 
Este concepto aplica a el Acuerdo de Paz? Aplica a otras leyes de Colombia? Sirve de 
alguna forma para enfrentar los problemas que ha dejado el conflicto? 
Does this concept apply to the Peace Accord? Does it apply to other Colombian laws? Is 
it in some way useful to address the problems that the conflict has produced? 
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 Entrevista con Instituciones 
Interviews with Institutions 
Fecha:_______________  
No._________________  
Cual es tu posición en esta institución?  
What is your position within this institution? 
De que se trata tu trabajo? Cual son tus tareas cotidianas? 
What does your work involve? What are some of your daily tasks? 
Porque decidiste tomar esta posición? De hacer este trabajo? 
Why did you decide to take this position? To do this work? 
Cuales son tus primeros recuerdos de el conflicto armado en Colombia, tal vez tus 
primeros tres recuerdos? 
What are your first memories of the armed conflict in Colombia, perhaps your first three 
memories? 
De lo que has estudiado y de lo que recuerdas, que es el conflicto armado? 
From what you have studied and from what you remember, what is this armed conflict? 
Que piensas son algunas de las causas del conflicto? 
What do you think are some of the causes of the conflict? 
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz? 
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord in general is progressing? 
Cual es el papel de esta institución en la implementación de el Acuerdo de Paz? 
What is the role of this institution in the implementation of the Peace Accord? 
De que se trata el monitoreo y verificación de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz? 
What is involved in monitoring and verifying of the implementation of the Peace Accord? 
Quienes son las víctimas del conflicto armado? 
Who are the victims of the armed conflict? 
Cual es el papel de víctimas en el Acuerdo de Paz? 
What is the role of victims in the Peace Accord? 
Como están participando las victims en la implementación del Acuerdo? 
How are victims participating in the implementation of the Accord? 
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Cual es el papel del gobierno en e Acuerdo de Paz?  
What is the role of the government in the Peace Accord? 
Que obligaciones tiene el gobierno a las víctimas del conflicto armado?  
What obligations dos the government have to victims of the the armed conflict? 
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz en los municipios mas afectados por 
el conflicto? 
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord is progressing in the 
communities most affected by the conflict? 
Como ves la situación de derechos humanos y seguridad en estos municipios? 
How do you understand the state of human rights and security in these municipalities? 
Que representa la implementación exitosa del Acuerdo de Paz? Como afectaría a la vida 
en las comunidades afectadas por el conflicto armado? 
What does the successful implementation of the Peace Accord represent? What would this 
look like in communities affected by the armed conflict? 
Que entiendes del concepto de Justicia Transicional? 
What do you understand by Transitional Justice? 
Este concepto aplica a el Acuerdo de Paz? Aplica a otras leyes de Colombia? Sirve de 
alguna forma para enfrentar los problemas que ha dejado el conflicto? 
Does this concept apply to the Peace Accord? Does it apply to other Colombian laws? Is 
it in some way useful to address the problems that the conflict has produced? 
Piensas que el Acuerdo cumple con normas nacionales y internacionales? 
Do you think the Accord conforms to national and international norms?
